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I. INTRODUCTION
Dignity can mean many things.1 In no sense is dignity itself a
recognized constitutional right. But that hardly shows that dignity is
constitutionally trivial. Dignity may help explain why we recognize
constitutional rights in the first place.2 It may also help explain the
value, scope, and limits of constitutional rights.3 Of more immediate
interest, dignity may help to fairly adjudicate between constitutional
claims in conflict.4
This Article focuses on dignity in a fundamental sense:5 as a value that
can fairly adjudicate between and make commensurate the often
conflicting constitutional values of free speech and equal protection.6
Dignity does not invariably push conflicts between free speech and equal
protection toward the same resolution in every case.7 Dignity in the
crucial sense can support or oppose the priority of either free speech or
equal protection claims, depending upon the circumstances.8
This use of dignity should not be surprising. After all, dignity in a
sufficiently deep sense is hardly foreign to our best explanations of the
constitutional status of both free speech and equal protection.9 Dignity
can thus provide something of a shared framework for assessing

1. 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 656-57 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner
eds., 2d ed. 1989) lists eleven distinguishable meanings of the term dignity, though
several are related and others are either obsolete or of minimal interest. The definition of
greatest interest for the purposes of this Article is the first: “The quality of being worthy
or honorable; worthiness, worth, nobleness, excellence.” Even this definition, though, to
the extent that it focuses on excellence, may tend to set up a conflict between dignity and
equality. Id. at 656.
2. See Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION
OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 10 (Michael J. Meyer & William A.
Parent eds., 1992).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part V.
5. See infra Parts III–IV.
6. See infra Part V.
7. See infra Part V.
8. See infra Part V.
9. See infra Part V.A. Ronald Dworkin offers a crucial, noninstrumental
justification of free speech: “[W]e retain our dignity, as individuals, only by insisting
that no one . . . has the right to withhold an[other’s] opinion from us on the ground that
we are not fit to hear and consider it.” RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 200 (1996).
In contrast, Catharine MacKinnon argues that “racist propaganda [causes] harms of
social inequality [in the form of] deprivation of human dignity,” among other harms,
when protected as free speech. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Speech, Equality, and Harm,
in THE PRICE WE PAY 301 (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995).
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conflicting constitutional claims involving free speech and equal
protection.10
Adding to the plausibility of this approach, dignity considerations do
not suggest that either free speech or equal protection concerns should
invariably override the other. Unavoidably, intelligent judgment will be
required in cases of conflict, or at least for general classes of conflicts.
Ultimately, judicial resolution of conflicts between free speech and equal
protection claims is based on a largely intuitive process including
reflection on matters of dignity.11
Though both the speaker and the nonspeaker (or target) in free speech
versus equality cases can often characterize their arguments in dignitybased terms, the opposing dignity claims need not be equally strong. In
a given case, one party’s dignity may be under direct and intentional
attack in a particularly crucial way, with a variety of important long-term
effects. Even in such difficult cases, it is not necessary that conflict
resolution between free speech and equal protection claims be arbitrary,
unprincipled, or based merely on individual preferences.12
The focus of this Article will thus be on the increasingly important
area of conflicts between free speech and equal protection. But it must
be emphasized that dignity-based approaches to conflicts between other
rights are also possible. Dignitary considerations, for example, seem
appropriate in explaining cases in which a free speech defense is raised
in a statutory Title VII workplace sexual harassment case.13 Dignitary
10. This is not to suggest that free speech and equal protection can never be
compatible or mutually supportive. See infra Part V.A. Both opposing parties can often
raise plausible equality or free speech claims. In fact, free speech values are likely in
one or more respects to appear on both sides of any free speech case. See R. George
Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are as Hard (And as Easy) as They Are, 68 TENN. L.
REV. 335, 336 (2001).
11. See R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42
HOUS. L. REV. 1381, 1406 (2006).
12. But see Gloria Cowan et al., Hate Speech and Constitutional Protection:
Priming Values of Equality and Freedom, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 247, 250 (2002) (stating
“‘there is no principled way of choosing one over another’”) (quoting john a. powell,
Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85 KY. L.J. 9, 19 (1997)).
Part of the value of a dignity-based approach may be its ability to transcend conflicts
between liberal-republicanism and communitarianism, or whether to begin with a focus
on rights or on good lives. See John Charles Evans, Book Review, 9 CATH. SOC. SCI.
REV. 2004, available at www.catholicsocialscientists.org (follow “The Catholic Social
Science Review” hyperlink) (reviewing IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY (Robert P.
Kraynak & Glenn Tinder eds., 2003)).
13. See, e.g., Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1246-47 (10th Cir.
1999) abrogated on other grounds by Boyler v. Cordant Techs., Inc., 316 F.3d 1137,
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considerations may also arise in free speech versus equal protection
contexts other than those on which this Article will focus14 and even in
legal contexts that seem abstract and institutional.15 Conflicts between
freedom of speech and equality, and directly between freedom of speech
and the value of dignity itself, also have international16 and comparative17
legal dimensions.
The strategy of this Article in illustrating the mediating potential of
dignity in free speech versus equal protection conflicts is straightforward.
We will first consider some of the ways in which dignity is actually
defined and utilized in some important constitutional contexts.18
Allusion to some classic historical accounts of the idea of dignity will
expand the frame of reference and increase the range of possible
constitutional analyses.19 These possibilities are then tested and refined
through reference to some interesting contemporary treatments of the
idea of dignity.20
The Article will clarify some background relationships between
general concepts of freedom and equality21 before addressing relationships
1142 (10th Cir. 2003); Greene v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763 (D. Md.
2005); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1534-36 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
14. We can imagine rethinking the free speech and equality dimensions of many
areas of the law in terms of dignity. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003)
(involving corporate speech in relation to working conditions in foreign factories);
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (involving commercial nudity); Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (involving government subsidized speech); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (involving electoral spending regulation).
15. For possible conflicts between aspects of free speech and equality or equal
protection, see generally Nicholas Wolfson, Equality in First Amendment Theory, 38 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 379 (1994) (referring to issues such as campaign spending, campaign
contributions, and media concentration).
16. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Hate-Speech Protocol to Cybercrime Convention,
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 973, 974-75 (2002).
17. See generally Ernst Benda, The Protection of Human Dignity (Article I of the
Basic Law), 53 SMU L. REV. 443 (2000); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A Comparative
Perspective on the First Amendment, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549 (2004); Laura R. Palmer, A Very
Clear and Present Danger: Hate Speech, Media Reform, and Post-Conflict Democratization
in Kosovo, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 179 (2001). For the leading Canadian hate speech case,
see The Queen v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R 697 (discussing high school class time
devoted to anti-Semitic teachings). For a discussion of Keegstra, see, for example,
Mayo Moran, Talking About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of American and
Canadian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1425. For a
recent significant European controversy, see the discussion of the group defamation suit
brought by William Goldnadel against Le Monde among other defendants in Craig S.
Smith, Europe Struggles with Boundaries of Free Speech, INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
www.iht.com/articles/2005/06/21/news/paris.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.A.
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specifically between freedom of speech and equal protection.22 The best
understandings of human dignity are then applied to more specific
contexts involving hate speech,23 including the distinct problem of
Confederate flag display in public schools.24 A brief conclusion reinforces
the value of dignity in explaining and resolving important conflicts
between free speech and equal protection.25
22. See infra Parts V.B.–C.
23. See infra Part V.B.
24. See infra Part V.C.
25. See infra Part VI. Note that the strategy of seeking to mediate between free
speech and equal protection on the basis of a particular value hardly requires that the
chosen value be that of dignity. In this context, john a. powell suggested the value of
“participation.” See powell, supra note 12, at 13-14, 66-69. The idea of participation
can certainly be linked to freedom of speech and equal protection. But focusing on
participation rather than on dignity involves several disadvantages for the purposes of
this Article.
One might first question whether the value of participation carries enough
“fundamentality” and leverage to do the work required. One can imagine a reasonable
person’s apathy toward participating in decisionmaking if his or her freedom of speech
and rights to equality are otherwise protected. Not participating may reflect reasonable
confidence in one’s colleagues, in the process of decisionmaking, or in the outcome. Not
caring about one’s dignity in some fundamental sense, however, seems much less
understandable and more disturbing. Dignity thus carries more gravity and is less
entirely optional than the choice to participate in some process.
Additionally, the idea of participation can be clarified only by deciding in advance the
scope, value, and priority of freedom of political speech and equality in collective
decisionmaking and the equal protection of the laws. The value of participation,
therefore, depends upon the value of freedom and of equal protection of the laws. The
idea of dignity, on the other hand, can be sufficiently described without relying on the
idea of freedom of speech or even of equality in general. Kant’s approach to dignity, for
example, depends upon absolutism, non-comparability, and on the non-interchangeability of
persons far more than upon the idea of equality. See infra Part III.
Before one can make the idea of participation meaningful, one must already have
decided upon the scope of freedom of speech on public issues and of equal protection in
decisionmaking. Participation, one must ask, in what? To what extent? In which ways?
Participation can be either “thin” or “thick,” direct or indirect, intensive or distant and
attenuated, and so on. The more seriously protection is extended to some forms of
equality and freedom of speech, the richer and fuller the varieties of participation that
will likely ensue. It seems unworkable to decide on the meaning and proper scope of
participation without having first settled the contours of public-issue free speech and
equal protection in collective decisionmaking.
Freedom of speech is often thought to serve democratic decisionmaking, among other
values. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119,
145-46 (1989). And it may be that persons cannot be autonomous in a rich and full sense
of the term if they are excluded from all opportunities to participate in decisionmaking.
But even if these arguments could be expanded, we would still not have a clear and
independent prior idea of valuable participation. The best we could hope for would be a
sort of mutually helpful circularity, defining participation on the one hand and
deliberative political free speech and equal protection in decisionmaking procedures on
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II. THE DIGNITY OF THE PERSON: SOME CONSIDERATIONS
FROM THE GENERAL CASE LAW
We will need to develop an understanding of dignity that can properly
mediate between the conflicting demands of free speech and equal
protection. The case law by itself does not fully articulate such an
understanding of dignity. Nor can the case law by itself fully justify the
use of the idea of dignity as a mediator between constitutional
provisions.
The cases can, however, provide a flavor of the current use of the idea
of dignity in one or more relevant senses. The case law can also
introduce us to relationships between dignity, freedom, and equality.26
We can then survey the most useful meanings of dignity27 and apply our
results in the context of some conflicts between free speech and equal
protection.28
A first step in sorting out meanings of dignity considers what we
ordinarily assume to oppose or violate dignity. At this early stage, we
can look mainly for convention rather than for precision, depth, or
sophistication. The case law provides references to a number of ideas
and practices in tension with the basic idea of human dignity.
Most starkly, the idea of brutality certainly seems readily opposed to
that of dignity. The tension, if not the direct opposition, between
brutality and dignity has been judicially implied in a number of cases.
The Supreme Court has accordingly recognized that “[c]onvictions
based on evidence obtained by methods that are ‘so brutal and so
offensive to human dignity’ that they ‘shock the conscience’ violate the
Due Process Clause.”29

the other. The idea of dignity as elaborated by Kant, among others, requires no
comparable circularity.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Parts III–IV.
28. See infra Part V.
29. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774 (2003) (quoting the classic case of
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 174 (1952), which overturned a conviction
based on evidence obtained by pumping the defendant’s stomach without consent).
Chavez involved a § 1983 action alleging a coercive police interrogation after the
suspect-plaintiff had been allegedly shot by an officer. Id. at 764; see also Thompson v.
Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 701 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Vaughn v. Ricketts, 859 F.2d 736,
742 (9th Cir. 1988)). Thompson involved an alleged visual strip search of a prisoner’s
body cavities and an alleged involuntary urinalysis test. See id. at 696-97. Vaughn
involved a more intrusive alleged physical search. See Vaughn, 859 F.2d at 742. For a
relevant discussion of Chavez, see Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 558 n.4 (3d Cir. 2003).
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The related idea of barbarity also helps in arriving at an understanding
of dignity,30 as the idea of civilized behavior does more positively.31
The legal concept of “cruel and unusual punishment”32 has also been
described as fundamentally opposed to human dignity,33 as have the
related ideas of torture34 and of “harsh or humiliating treatment.”35
Certain kinds of treatment can be classified under headings that
ordinarily stand in opposition to the dignity of the person. The severity
of any offense against dignity, however, may vary widely within the
range of each general heading. A dignitary violation of bodily intrusion,
for example, may range from allegedly coerced blood tests,36 through
any sort of unconsented-to medical experimentation,37 to surgical
alteration of the body,38 or alleged sexual assault by a prison guard.39

30. See, e.g., United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598, 608 (9th Cir. 2004)
(upholding a release condition requiring a prisoner to wear a sign reading “I stole mail.
This is my punishment.”).
31. See id.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
33. See Gementera, 379 F.3d at 608 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1958)).
34. See Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1222 n.11 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing
international authority) (asylum application case).
35. Id.; see also Jones v. Cuningham, No. 03-15948, 2004 WL 500998, at *1 (9th
Cir. Mar. 12, 2004) (alleging humiliation through forced exhibitionism of prisoner)
(citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (alleged prison sexual
assault case)).
36. See, e.g., Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1171 (10th
Cir. 2003) (alleging coerced warrantless blood test associated with traffic stop).
37. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“There are limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority
may conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and
natural powers of a minority . . . .”) (enforced sterilization of multiple-conviction
prisoner) (addressing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (Justice Holmes
pronouncing, in a sterilization case, that “three generations of imbeciles are enough.”)).
Also see the more recent case of United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987),
involving the alleged secret administration to service personnel of LSD pursuant to an
Army experiment. Justice Brennan observed in Stanley that “[t]he subject of
experimentation who has not volunteered is treated as an object, a sample.” Id. at 708
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan concluded that
“[s]oldiers ought not be asked to defend a Constitution indifferent to their essential
human dignity.” Id.
38. None of the cases referenced in note 37 supra involved genuinely free and
voluntary, knowing and informed consent; in each case, the primary intended beneficiary
seems to have been society rather than the individual subjected to the invasive bodily
intrusion itself.
39. See, e.g., Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1197.
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More generally, it is entirely common to see some invasions of
physical privacy as impinging upon dignity. Thus, for example, “humiliation
from . . . forced exhibitionism [can be] ‘deeply offensive to human
dignity.’”40 More explicitly, courts have held that “[i]ndividualized
suspicion is required for a law enforcement search because ‘[t]he
interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment
protect forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that evidence
might be obtained.’”41
Privacy violations in a broader sense may also oppose human dignity.
Judge John Noonan of the Ninth Circuit recently referred in a
persecution and asylum case to the congressional belief that China’s one
child policy is “deeply offensive . . . to human dignity.”42 In such a case,
the central indignity is the imposition of some legal penalty for violating
the policy, or coerced compliance with the policy. But even the
enactment of the policy itself arguably amounts to an affront to dignity.
We thus have a sense that however we ultimately use it, the idea of
dignity must stand in tension with ideas such as brutality, cruelty,
torture, humiliation, uncivilized or barbarous behavior, harsh treatment,
and various sorts of intrusion and privacy invasion.43 We can therefore
negatively triangulate the idea of dignity, within limits, even without a
more positively developed theory of dignity.
A further lesson is that dignity has a recognized constitutional
dimension, and this dimension encompasses a number of constitutional
provisions. Infringement of dignity may take the form, for example, of a
violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.44 The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable
40. See Jones, 2004 WL 500998, at *1 (quoting Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1197).
There can be indignity without subjective feelings of humiliation or violation on the part
of the victim. See, e.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 512 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting children
may have dignitary interests beyond their limited subjective expectation of privacy); see
also VICTOR HUGO, THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME 51-54, 65, 69-70 (Walter J. Cobb
& Phyllis LaFarge trans., Signet Penguin 1965) (1831) (public humiliation of
Quasimodo as subjectively unrecognized by the latter).
41. United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 202 (3d Cir. 2005) (McKee, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (involving
refusal of a probation officer’s requirement to provide a DNA sample)); see also Evans
v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Barkett, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70) (involving an
alleged strip search and body cavity search).
42. Li v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 959, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2004) (Noonan, J., dissenting).
43. See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (involving the alleged
prolonged use of a “hitching post” for inmate discipline). The “basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment . . . is nothing less than the dignity of man.” Id. (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257, 271
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The primary principle is that a punishment must not
be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings.”) (death penalty for
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searches and seizures similarly protects dignitary interests.45 Dignity
may be at the heart of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 46
or procedural due process47 claims as well.48
More central to our concerns, however, are the relationships between
dignity and freedom and between dignity and equality, or more
specifically, between dignity and freedom of speech and between dignity
and the equal protection of the laws. We will explore the various
supporting and conflicting relationships below, focusing on dignity as an
intermediator between conflicting free speech and equal protection
claims.49
The indignities of slavery, caste, segregation, and discrimination
implicate both freedom and inequality not just as a matter of ethics but
in constitutional substance. Thus the cases recognize the intent of the
Constitution’s “broad provisions to secure individual freedom and
preserve human dignity.”50 This recognition does not strictly imply any
rape); United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 608 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Trop, 356
U.S. at 100).
45. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70; Evans, 407 F.3d at 1296-97;
Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 202 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S at 769-70).
46. See, e.g., Anderson v. Larson, 327 F.3d 762, 769 (8th Cir. 2003) (alleging
unlawful arrest and prosecution) (citing Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1051 (8th Cir.
1998)).
47. Professor Mashaw developed this line of analysis most notably in Jerry L.
Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L.
REV. 885 (1981). See also Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 244 (4th Cir. 2005) (en
banc) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (death penalty prosecutor’s alleging “comparative
human worth” jury argument) (“[D]ue process at its core contains a commitment to treat
all litigants as individuals of equal dignity.” (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 636
n.2 (1986))) (petition for writ of certiorari filed May 18, 2005). The dissenting opinion
in Ozmint relied on its interpretation of Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823 (1991),
which rejected arguments that the death penalty can be a legitimate response to a
perceived difference in the life worth of the defendant and victim.
48. This is not to deny the existence of “dignitary torts.” See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS,
LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.1, at 259 (1993) (discussing defamation, privacy and emotional
distress torts). For an extended sense of “dignity” encompassing a broad range of
personal torts, see Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ginsberg, 351 F.3d 473, 479 n.3 (11th Cir.
2003). See also Andrew L. Merritt, Damages for Emotional Distress, in Fraud
Litigation: Dignitary Torts in a Commercial Society, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1989). We
need not assume that all dignitary torts must involve constitutionally protected interests.
49. See infra Parts V.A.–B.
50. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (juvenile death penalty); see also
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (discussing freedom of speech as required
by “the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests”);
Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 739-40 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J.,
concurring specially) (disparate treatment employment) (“[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1964
was enacted ‘to promote a more abiding commitment to freedom, a more constant

535

WRIGHT.DOC

11/9/2006 4:01 PM

substantive relationship between freedom and dignity. It is possible that
constitutional provisions could be intended to serve both freedom and
dignity, with no essential overlap. But as we shall demonstrate, this
seems unlikely.51
The cases similarly recognize the common constitutional dimension of
the quest for equality, or for equal protection, and dignity. The Court in
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware,52 for example, refers to “the basic rights
of dignity and equality that this country had fought a Civil War to
secure.”53 Commentary on the case law in the United States54 and
elsewhere55 has pursued the idea of a link between dignity and equality
as well. This Article will address the linkages between freedom and
dignity and between equality and dignity, and their intermediation,
below.56
This is not to suggest that only cases discussing dignity explicitly can
teach us about the constitutional role of dignity. Consider, for example,
the following trial court transcript in which the ideas of speech, equality,
and dignity57 implicitly support and conflict with one another. The
excerpt is introduced in the words of Justices Douglas and Goldberg:
In Hamilton v. Alabama, . . . we reversed a judgment of contempt on a Negro
witness under these circumstances:
“‘Cross examination by Solicitor Rayburn:
‘Q. What is your name please?’
pursuit of justice, and a deeper respect for human dignity.’” (quoting President Lyndon
B. Johnson, Radio and Television Remarks upon Signing the Civil Rights Bill, in 2 PUB.
PAPERS OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1963-64, at 842-44 (1965))).
51. See infra Part V.A. At the case law level, as distinct from more theoretical
jurisprudence, see, for example, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 76 (1917) (discussing
the Civil War amendments as promoting both freedom and “equality of civil rights”).
52. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
53. Id. at 918. For an attempt to synthesize free speech with equality and dignity
in the form of “equal dignity,” see Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 980 P.2d 846
(1999) (Brown, J., dissenting). “In permitting speech, but requiring the speaker to pay
damages for injurious speech, the California Constitution preserves both the freedom of
the speaker and the equal dignity of the audience. This compromise not only
discourages injurious speech, but may also foster positive change in the speaker’s
attitudes.” Id. at 894.
54. See, e.g., Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 669 (2005) (discussing the linkage between dignity and equality as nonsubordination and the underutilization of dignity-based analysis in contemporary
jurisprudence).
55. Denise G. Réaume, Discrimination and Dignity, 63 LA. L. REV. 645 (2003)
(discussing dignity, as opposed to imputations of lesser worth or lesser respectworthiness, as a key element in Canadian jurisprudence of equality and rights to
equality).
56. See infra Parts V.A.–B.
57. This is not to suggest that conscious slights in forms of address reflecting a
racial hierarchy should be analyzed in the same terms of indignity as might be most
applicable to other constitutional conflicts.
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‘A. Miss Mary Hamilton.’
‘Q. Mary, I believe - - you were arrested - - who were you arrested by?’
‘A. My name is Miss Hamilton. Please address me correctly.’
‘Q. Who were you arrested by, Mary?’
‘A. I will not answer a question - -’
‘By Attorney Amaker: The witness’s name is Miss Hamilton.’
‘A. - - your question until I am addressed correctly.’
‘The Court: Answer the question.’
‘The Witness: I will not answer them unless I addressed correctly.’
‘The Court: You are in contempt of court - -’
‘Attorney Conley: Your honor - - your honor - -’
‘The Court: You are in contempt of this court, and you are sentenced to five
58
days in jail and a fifty dollar fine.’”

This incident is fairly bursting with unstated speech, compulsion, equality,
hierarchy, deference, and dignity issues. While indignities in the context
of speech and inequality can take many culturally dependent forms,59
general theoretical approaches to dignity can nonetheless be developed,
as discussed below.
III. SOME CLASSICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE GROUNDS
AND MEANINGS OF DIGNITY
When the law speaks of human dignity,60 the meaning and force of its
assertions depend on the broader treatments of dignity that have shaped
our culture over time. The dependence is inescapable, whether judges
are consciously aware of this reliance or not. It is difficult to detect any
real difference between judicial opinions that explicitly cite, for
example, the relevant work on the dignity of philosopher Immanuel
Kant,61 and related opinions that cite neither Kant nor any other
58. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242, 248 n.4 (1964) (opinion of Douglas and
Goldberg, JJ.) (quoting, in a “relic of slavery” context, the record in Hamilton v.
Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964) (per curiam) (summarily reversing Ex parte Hamilton v.
Alabama, 156 So. 2d 926 (1963))); see also ANTONY FLEW, THE POLITICS OF
PROCRUSTES: CONTRADICTIONS OF ENFORCED EQUALITY 41 (1981) (noting in connection
with Hamilton, 376 U.S. 650, that in some contexts it is possible to utter intentionally or
unintentionally demeaning language, not in the form of epithet or argument, but through
in some sense not technically or literally incorrect forms of address).
59. See FLEW, supra note 58.
60. The reference throughout to “human dignity” should not be taken to imply that
only human beings are capable of possessing dignity in the relevant sense. The phrase
human dignity, suggesting but hardly proving the uniqueness of humans in this respect,
is simply entrenched in much of the historical discussion of dignity. References thereto
do not imply endorsement.
61. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 767-68 (La. 1992). Perry addressed
whether the state could medicate an incompetent but unconsenting prisoner for purposes
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philosopher.62 Popular versions of philosophical accounts of dignity are
an element of the jurisprudential air we breathe. Inevitably, philosophical
accounts inform our constitutional case law on the meanings, sources,
and roles of dignity.
Let us start near the beginning. Among the ancients, Plato, though not
an egalitarian with regard to people’s capacities, at least credits every
person with the capacity to reason and to apprehend truths.63 Plato
offers in this respect some elements of an approach to the dignity of the
person. Aristotle in turn refers to the life of the intellect as reflecting our
highest, best, and truest selves.64 A divine element within us, or some
sort of relatedness to the divine, becomes an important component of a
common historical understanding of the nature of human dignity, as seen
below.65
In the ensuing Stoic philosophical tradition, the themes of elemental
human equality and universal human relatedness,66 a common rationality,67

of rendering the prisoner competent for execution. Id. at 747. The court explicitly
discussed Kantian theory of punishment, crucially concluding that “Immanuel Kant, the
leading defender of the severe form of retribution, argued that the state should never do
anything to a criminal that humiliates and degrades his dignity as a human being.” Id. at
767; see also id. at 779, 781 (Cole, J., dissenting); United States v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d
192, 200-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“‘Immanuel Kant . . . held that only a retributivist theory
is properly responsive to the criminal’s dignity as a rational agent capable of moral
conduct, a dignity which he retains despite his commission of a legal offense.’” (quoting
Leon Pearl, A Case Against the Kantian Retributivist Theory of Punishment: A Response
to Professor Pugsley, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 274 (1982))).
62. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 228 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“The country has debated whether a society for which the dignity of the individual is the
supreme value can . . . follow the practice of deliberately putting some of its members to
death.”); Id. at 229 (discussing the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as requiring
that punishment be “consistent with [citizens’] intrinsic worth as human beings—a
punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity”); Id. at 230
(“[The death penalty is] inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause that
even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.”
(quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972)); see also DeGarmo v. Texas,
474 U.S. 973, 973 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of petition for writ of
certiorari) (quoting language immediately above in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 230). Justice
Brennan’s language can certainly be thought of as philosophical, and as Kantianinfluenced in particular, but is without explicit reference to Kant’s work.
63. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, bk. VII, at 232 (Francis M. Cornford trans.,
1972) (“[T]he soul of every [person] does possess the power of learning the truth and the
organ to see it with . . . .”).
64. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. X, at 275-76 (J.A.K. Thomson
trans., 1953).
65. See infra notes 68, 70-74, 78, and accompanying text.
66. See MARCUS AURELIUS, MEDITATIONS, bk. IV, at 63 (Maxwell Staniforth
trans., 1964) (“[A]ll rational beings are created for one another . . . .”); id. bk. VII, at 106
(“[A]ll law is one (namely, the common reason which all thinking creatures
possess . . . .”)); id. bk. VII, at 109 (universal brotherhood).
67. See supra note 66.
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and the achievability of godlikeness68 or the perfected life69 are developed
by Marcus Aurelius. Particularly relevant to the developing account of
human dignity is the claim by the later Stoic writer Seneca that “there
resides within us a divine spirit, which guards us and watches us in the
evil and the good we do.”70
An even more systematically and thoroughly religious approach to the
dignity of the person was developed by writers including Augustine71
and Thomas Aquinas.72 In this tradition, the commonly shared quality of
being created in the image of God is central, and is variously explained
and interpreted. But some combination of the equally shared capacity
for the exercise of intellect, will, memory, or emotional response forms
its core.73
With the Renaissance, Pico della Mirandola emphasized precisely
what was not fixed and unalterable in presenting his account of human
dignity. Instead, Pico emphasized the protean, directable character of
our “nature,” capable as we are, by free choice, of descending into the
68. See AURELIUS, supra note 66, bk. VII, at 117 (“It is perfectly possible to be
godlike . . . .”).
69. See id. bk. XI, at 171 (“The good life can be achieved to perfection by any soul
capable of showing indifference to the things that are themselves indifferent.”).
70. Letter from Seneca to Lucilius (letter XLI), in LETTERS FROM A STOIC 86
(Robin Campbell trans., 1969).
71. One contemporary commentator writes that:
[F]or Augustine being an image of God is an essential feature of the human
mind. It is not a title indicating a state of moral perfection, bestowed
exclusively on the wise, or upon believers . . . however much it abuses its
freedom it never stops carrying the image of God in itself. For Augustine,
being an image of God is an undeletable character of the human mind. This is
why the dignity of the human person is inviolable.
Johannes Brachtendorf, Augustine on Human Dignity, Love of Neighbor, and the Role of
the Passions, http://www3.villanova.edu/mission/Brachtendorf/JB3.pdf at 2. (last visited
Oct. 1, 2006). Augustine emphasizes the three-in-one multiple unity of an integrated
intellect, will, and memory, not merely in special moments of reflective self-awareness,
but also in states of sleep or unconsciousness. See id.
72. Aquinas writes in the Summa Theologica that “there is in man a likeness to
God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect.” THOMAS AQUINAS, 1 SUMMA
THEOLOGICA 469 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Brothers,
Inc. 1948). More specifically, “man is said to be to the image of God by reason of his
intellectual nature . . . .” Id. at 471. The use of “intellectual” here is simultaneously too
broad and too narrow, as Aquinas then emphasizes that “man possesses a natural aptitude
for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the
mind, which is common to all men.” Id. By the word translated as “men,” Aquinas
explicitly intends to include men and women. Id. at 472.
73. For a broader discussion, see Richard C. Dales, A Medieval View of Human
Dignity, 38 J. HIST. IDEAS 557 (1977).

539

WRIGHT.DOC

11/9/2006 4:01 PM

abyss or of soaring to divine heights, and thereby exercising a capacity
for freedom, self-direction, and self-construction denied to the beasts
and even to the angels.74
Further development of the early modern understanding of dignity,
deemphasizing our outward inequalities, came from Michel de Montaigne.
One commentator suggests that Montaigne emphasized his own humility
“as if to prove that a man’s worth is all inside, and independent of
outward glory.”75 It is further suggested that for Montaigne, “[w]orldly
success, . . . whether based on good fortune or on real ability, proves
nothing of a man’s worth; on the contrary, it diverts attention from his
true substance and ought to be disregarded.”76
Montaigne’s near contemporary, Shakespeare, famously reflected on
the subject of human dignity. For a view perhaps only temporary in its
felt enthusiasm, we have Hamlet’s “What piece of work is a man, how
noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how
express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension,
how like a god: the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals . . . .”77
Later, John Locke’s influential account of human dignity more
systematically emphasized human equality, the capacity to engage in
moral reasoning, and the divine source of human dignity itself.78 Locke
was especially attuned to political assaults on dignity and freedom. His
successor George Berkeley instead emphasized the general efforts of
philosophers “to raise and refine humankind, and remove it as far as
possible from the brute; . . . to remind them of the dignity of their nature;
to awaken and improve their superior faculties, and direct them to the
noblest objects . . . .”79
74. See, e.g., GIOVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF
MAN (A. Robert Caponigri trans., A Gateway Edition 1956). For a more concise,
selective version, see Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man: Oration of
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Count of Concordia, 3 J. HIST. IDEAS 347, 348
(Elizabeth Livermore Forbes trans., 1942).
75. Abraham C. Keller, Montaigne on the Dignity of Man, 72 PUB. MOD. LANG.
ASS’N AM. 43, 54 (1957).
76. Id. (Montaigne’s corresponding text is probably from the period 1586-1588).
For a comprehensive one-volume source, see MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, COMPLETE ESSAYS
(Donald M. Frame trans., Stanford Univ. Press ed., 1958)
77. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2, lines 303-07 (Harold Jenkins ed.,
Methuen 1982).
78. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 5-6 (Thomas P.
Peardon ed., The Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1689) (“[R]eason . . . teaches all mankind
who will but consult it that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm
another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of
one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker . . . they are . . . made to last during his, not
one another’s pleasure . . . .”). For exceptionally thoughtful discussion, see generally
JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY (2002).
79. See GEORGE BERKELEY, ALCIPHIRON, OR THE MINUTE PHILOSOPHER IN FOCUS
44 (David Berman ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1732) (character of Crito).
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Summarizing even this extremely condensed pre-Kantian survey
cannot be fairly done. But there is certainly value in noticing some of
the typologies and classifications that contemporary writers present in
summarizing the classical tradition. One such framework cites the
following as sources of dignity: the idea of human intellect and free will
as reflecting creation in the image of God; humanity as a distinctive
reconciliation of crucial opposites such as mind and matter; the sense
that humans are the last, highest, most developed element of creation;
and some asserted distinctive and special relationship between the
human and the divine.80
An alternative framework for classifying traditional thought on human
dignity emphasizes the subtle difference between the infinite value of
persons and the irreplaceability or non-substitutability of persons.81 This
framework then highlights the importance to personhood of the capacity
for rationality;82 the capacity for a reflexively self-aware selfconsciousness;83 the capacity to choose and act for moral or nonmoral
reasons towards some selected purpose;84 the capacity to value other

Berkeley’s successor, David Hume, adopts a more contemporary tack. Hume finds our
attitude of “respect” for the distinctive excellences of others explainable as a sort of
mixture between pure admiration for excellence and our humility in recognizing our own
personal lack of the quality admired in another. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE bk. II, pt. II, § X (ch. 58) (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press,
1968) (1740).
A number of conceptual and psychological issues associated with dignity, respect,
contempt, esteem, and self-esteem, along with objective and subjective elements thereof,
are explored in HUGO, THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME, supra note 40, at 51-54, 65,
69-70. Hugo describes the mocking “investiture” of the loathed and feared Quasimodo
as the “Pope of Fools” in the following terms:
It is difficult to give an idea of how much pride and beatific satisfaction
registered on the usually sad and always hideous visage of Quasimodo as he
rode. It was the first moment of self-love he had ever enjoyed . . . . He took
seriously all the ironical applause, all of the mock-respect.
Id. at 65.
80. See Thomas A. Shannon, Grounding Human Dignity, 43 Dialog 113-17.
Alternatively, for an exceptionally learned but concise cross-cultural survey of
conceptions and rationales for human dignity culminating in a brief discussion of the
idea of human dignity in modern German and Israeli law, see Izhak Englard, Human
Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel’s Constitutional Framework, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1903 (2000).
81. See Linda Zagzebski, The Uniqueness of Persons, 29 J. RELIG. ETHICS 401,
419-21 (2001).
82. See id. at 405-06.
83. See id. at 406-08.
84. See id. at 408-10.
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persons and to act on their behalf;85 and finally the value of persons as
truly unique, distinctive, individual, and incomparable subjects.86
No inventory of perspectives on the meaning, logic, and foundations
of dignity can avoid giving a central place to the later contributions of
the philosopher Immanuel Kant. The Kantian idea of dignity can be
approached through the related idea of respect. Kant discusses respect in
the following evocative terms:
Respect is always directed only to persons, never to things. The latter can
awaken in us inclination and even love if they are animals . . . , or also fear, like
the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey, but never respect. Something that comes
nearer to this feeling is admiration, and this as . . . amazement, can be directed
to things also, for example, lofty mountains, the magnitude, number, and
distance of the heavenly bodies, the strength and swiftness of many animals,
and so forth. But none of this respect.87

Respect in the sense intended by Kant is thus confined to persons. But
more positively, “[e]very human being has a legitimate claim to respect
from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect every
other.”88 Respect in the basic Kantian sense is thus owed universally,
from all persons, to all persons.
Kant is emphatic in a formulation of this point that will bear directly
on the problem of hate speech versus equality.89 He declares that “[t]o
be contemptuous of others . . . , that is, to deny them the respect owed to
human beings in general, is in every case contrary to duty; for they are
human beings.”90 Kant plainly denies that there can be groups of
persons undeserving of, or who have forfeited, an exemption from
expressions of contempt. And he does not treat expressions of contempt
as anything less than an invariable breach of the duty of respect.
On this basis, Kant infers “a duty to respect a human being even in the
logical use of his reason, a duty not to censure his errors by calling them
absurdities, poor judgment, and so forth . . . .”91 To condemn all
contemptuous mockery, including the relatively civil and restrained
85. See id. at 410-23.
86. See id. at 415-16.
87. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 66 [5:76] (Mary Gregor
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1788) (emphasis omitted). We do have in English
a sense of respect in which we say we “respect” the eagle’s sharp talons, or we “respect”
the cobra’s ability to strike quickly. But this sense of respect is akin merely to
something like “plan for and behave in accordance with the risk or threat realistically
posed.” This is clearly some distance from the ideas of respect for a distinguished or an
institutional person, or a respect for persons in general.
88. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 209 [6:462, § 38] (Mary
Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797) (emphasis omitted).
89. See infra Part V.B.
90. See KANT, supra note 88, at 209 [6:462 § 39] (emphasis omitted).
91. Id. at 210 [6:462 § 39].
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forms referred to immediately above, is quite inescapably to condemn all
sorts of individualized and group based hate speech. Thus, Kant
elsewhere condemns even the relatively mild communicative expression
translated as “scoffing” as contrary to human dignity.92 Speech presumed
to violate basic moral duty does not cease to be speech for constitutional
purposes. But such speech may present a less agonizing tradeoff against
equality values. We can hardly ignore the clear implications of Kant’s
strictures in reflecting on the constitutional status and comparative
constitutional value of hate speech and epithet speech in particular.
We can hardly understand, however, how contemptuous mockery can
be contrary to human dignity except to the extent we understand dignity
in the first place. Kant distinguishes between dignity and price.93 If
something “has a price, something else can be put in its place as an
equivalent; if it is exalted above all price and so admits of no equivalent,
then it has a dignity.”94 Dignity is thus “infinitely above all price, with
which it cannot be brought into reckoning or comparison without, as it
were, a profanation of its sanctity.”95
If we try to clarify the source of dignity, Kant refers to our capacity
for autonomy,96 our capacity for free and rational moral choice and moral
rulemaking.97 But we must distinguish between acting autonomously and
92. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 239 (Louis Infield trans., Harper
Torchbook 1963) (1930). Among the Kantian commentators, Thomas Hill emphasizes
that for Kant, human dignity embodied in rational capacity must be honored in word,
gesture, attitude, as well as in deed. Thus “[m]ockery is opposed, whether or not it is
effective for the purpose of reform or deterrent, because it reflects a disrespectful attitude
toward the humanity of others.” Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Humanity as an End in Itself, 91
ETHICS 84, 97 (1980); see also THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN
KANT’S MORAL THEORY 49 (1992) (discussing Kant’s rejection of mockery on grounds
that it is “contrary to the dignity of humanity” and violative of an “exceptionless” moral
duty); CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS 211 (1996) (“Kant
believes that we cannot know people’s most fundamental or intelligible characters. But
he censures contempt, calumny, and mockery as much for their disrespectful and
ungenerous nature as for their lack of a theoretical basis.”).
93. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 102 (H.
J. Paton trans., Harper Touchbooks 1964) (1785).
94. Id. (emphasis omitted).
95. Id. at 103. Thus dignity bears, or itself is, “an unconditioned and incomparable
worth.” Id.
96. See id.; see also HILL, DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT’S MORAL
THEORY, supra note 92, at 47 (“Autonomy is said to be the ground of dignity, and this is
a property of the will of every rational being . . . .”).
97. See KANT, supra note 93, at 103. The incomparable worth of dignity is partly
a matter of the fact that “humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing
which has dignity.” Id. at 102.
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our capacity to act autonomously. Autonomy, for Kant, is something
like freedom that is rightly used. Autonomy itself involves adopting or
adhering to a universal rational moral law.98 But it is the broader idea of
our freedom, or precisely our mere capacity to act autonomously and
thus to act morally rightly or morally wrongly, that is of incomparable
worth and that gives us dignity.99
Thus Kant does not think that we forfeit our incomparable dignity if
we choose to act immorally.100 Kant, along with the rest of us,
occasionally refers in a colloquial sense to throwing away our dignity by
some unworthy, degrading act.101 But in a deeper, more fundamental
sense, we do not. Kant “repeatedly implies that a person’s humanity [or
capacity for moral rationality] remains, and so must be respected, even
though he defiles, abases, violates, dishonors, or rejects it.”102
This certainly means that choosing immorally to engage in hate
speech cannot involve any forfeiture of the speaker’s own essential
human dignity. But it is equally impossible, in Kant’s terms, for the
targets of hate speech to forfeit their own essential dignity, opening the
door to contemptuous mockery or scoffing, let alone to actual hate
speech. No one capable of free and rational moral decisionmaking, of
consulting a conscience, or of moral praiseworthiness or blameworthiness
can be an appropriate object of hate speech.103
The attitudes and beliefs underlying much hate speech thus mark the
speech as violative of basic Kantian moral principles. Most hate speech,
to the extent that it bespeaks any articulable ideas at all, suggests some
inferiority or inadequacy of the target group. But for Kant, real or
98. See, e.g., PAUL GUYER, KANT ON FREEDOM, LAW AND HAPPINESS 155 (2000).
99. See id. at 151 (Kant “sees our capacity to set and pursue ends of our own
choice as a fundamental manifestation of our freedom and sees freedom itself as
possessing absolute value.”); see also KANT, supra note 93, at 103; JOHN RAWLS,
LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 211 (Barbara Herman ed., 2000) (For
Kant, “[t]he capacity for a good will defines the aristocracy of all.”). “[I]t is in virtue of
the capacity for a good will that each person has dignity.” Id. at 210; see also Mark
Timmons, Book Review, 104 ETHICS 398, 399 (1994) (reviewing HILL, DIGNITY AND
PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY, supra note 92).
100. See HILL, DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT’S MORAL THEORY, supra
note 92, at 47. Put somewhat differently, dignity belongs to persons to whom actions
and choices can properly be imputed, or “to any finite being who has, or can be
presumed to have, a conscience.” Susan M. Shell, Kant on Human Dignity, in IN
DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY 53, 56 (Robert P. Kraynak & Glenn Tinder eds., 2003).
101. Hill, Humanity as an End in Itself, supra note 92.
102. Id.
103. It may be unclear how hate speech could be logically appropriate in the case of
targets not meeting the minimum criteria for Kantian dignity. Hate speech directed
toward simple animals or mere objects may give them “too much” credit, as though they
could be blameworthy. Perhaps, though, what is called hate speech directed at pure
abstract ideas or ideologies, or even at general institutions such as slavery, could be
logically in order.
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imagined inequalities among persons do not bear upon the shared human
dignity that morally bars hate speech. Human dignity is neither achieved
through comparative success nor lost through immorality104 or real or
alleged relative failure, the subtext of much hate speech. What
distinguishes people from other persons, favorably or unfavorably, does
not confer or negate human dignity.105
A bit more elaborately,
[Kantian dignity] attributes a basic worth to all human beings independently of
class, talent, achievement, and even moral effort. To acknowledge this worth
fully we must do more than respect rights and be charitable; we must value and
respect all persons as persons, regardless of status and merit, in attitudes as well
as in deed.106

Another leading interpreter of Kant expresses this important point in
the following terms:
[T]o demand that others earn [respect for their dignity] is in effect to hold that
our obligations to others rest (at least in part) on their distinctive excellences
rather than fully and unconditionally on their humanity. To require that respect
be earned is to hold that people are to be respected in part for what distinguishes
them from others . . . .107

From the Kantian perspective, supposed or even actual instances of
inferiority thus cannot justify hate speech, as real or imagined
inferiorities cannot detract from the respect owed to all dignity-bearing
persons.
This is not to suggest that a Kantian could not recognize a
constitutional right to speak or even to act, through speech, in a clearly
and deeply immoral way. But a Kantian could certainly take the
assumed immorality of speech into proper account in adjudicating cases
in which an asserted speech right conflicts with other constitutional
values, including equality or equal protection. The free speech versus

104. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
105. Thus, Kant wishes us to value persons not on what gives them individuality,
but on what persons are in common. Hill, Humanity as an End in Itself, supra note 92, at
88 n.2.
106. THOMAS E. HILL, JR., AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 156 (1991).
107. ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT’S ETHICAL THOUGHT 135 (1999). To carry the
implication to more dramatic lengths, Professor Wood argues that Kant holds “that all
the normal (comparative and competitive) measures of people’s self-worth—wealth,
power, honor, prestige, charm, charisma, even happy relationships with others—are
expressions of an utterly false sense of values.” Id. at 133.
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equal protection conflict becomes more readily resolvable through the
Kantian conception of dignity.
There remains, however, a problem for the Kantian approach to hate
speech and equality. In rare cases, the logic underlying hate speech may
take an especially radical form. Such cases could go beyond accusations
of the inferiority of the target group. The hate speaker could believe the
target group lacks the requisites for Kantian dignity, and therefore does
not qualify for respect on Kant’s own terms.
The idea would be that the target group members are not only inferior
in some important respect, but that they lack even the capacity for
rational moral decisionmaking, a conscience, or any moral responsibility
in the sense of a capacity for genuine praiseworthiness or blameworthiness.108
The hate speaker in such a case could agree with Kant about the basic
logic of human dignity, and about respecting human dignity, while
denying that the targets qualify for respect on Kant’s criteria.
Such an approach may seem extreme even among hate speakers.
Some hate speakers may not have formulated a precise stance on this
question. There may be an incongruity between the speaker’s plainly
malicious attitude and the supposed incapability of the target group to
bear any moral responsibility. Surely some hate speech involves
rhetorical exaggeration that is not taken literally even by the speaker.
We should not, however, casually sanitize either the rhetoric or the
beliefs of extreme hate speakers. Some hate speech invective carries
extreme implications. For example, some groups are referred to
explicitly as “subhuman”109 not merely as a matter of history,110 but of
current-day reality.111
108. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Justice and Reconciliation in the Great Lakes
Region of Africa, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 325, 347 (1997) (noting that violation of
human rights is often preceded by “dehumanization” of the enemy or victim, although
often ascribing some degree of residual humanity to the victim, the better to
meaningfully hate that victim) (citing Ali A. Mazrui, Human Rights and the Moving
Frontier of World Culture, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 243, 243
(1986)); D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self,
82 GEO. L.J. 437, 459-62 (1993) (“[T]he slave is outside of culture and therefore is
nonhuman; is deprived of freedom and therefore is a beast; is voiceless and therefore is
an object; is ignorant and therefore is a child.”); Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88
MICH. L. REV. 1971, 2004 (1990) (noting the Dred Scott-era Supreme Court as adopting
a “subhuman-property” position regarding the slavery of the time); infra notes 110-11.
110. See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Trott, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the Nazi-led Croatian
Ustasha regime as viewing some “not as human beings, but as subhuman according to
Nazi and Ustasha ideology”); Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 810 (3d Cir.
2001) (Shadur, J., dissenting in part) (referring to the center of the historical tobacco
growing region as “an area where Blacks were once chattels, viewed as subhuman”).
111. See, e.g., Ali v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding
insufficient INS rebuttal of asylum-seeker’s claim that particular clan members “are
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The term subhuman as used by hate speakers may be ambiguous. It
may be possible to be somehow subhuman and still meet the Kantian
criteria for dignity.112 But the term subhuman hardly requires a belief
that those referred to possess the requisites of Kantian dignity.
Doubtless such subtleties may be lost on many hate speakers. We would
all, however, benefit from a clarification of the basic Kantian theory that
could more directly address cases where hate speakers carry the most
extreme beliefs about their targets’ capacities.
Consider again the cases in which there is a refusal to credit true, full,
and nondefective humanity to some target group. The target group is
thought to be less than human, not fully human, not truly human, only
defectively human, pseudohuman, mere infidel dogs, or devils as
opposed to human.113 But such phrases, without further specification,
could conceivably encompass beings who do, and others who do not,
meet the Kantian dignitary requirements.
Matters may seem clearer with regard to those thought of literally as
“infidels” or as “devils” rather than as human beings. Particularly when
the speaker clearly morally blames the purported infidels or devils for
their status, is not the speaker conceding the target’s possession of the
specifically Kantian elements of dignity and respect-worthiness?114
Does not such a speaker then logically owe us some response to Kant’s
basic logic?
Unfortunately, this depends on the further details of the speaker’s
belief system. Some targets may have culpably turned themselves into
infidels or devils by their own responsible moral choice. But others may
not have. And it is possible that freely becoming an infidel or a devil
may be thought to undermine any future capacity for free and rational
moral choice, for conscience, or for any future moral responsibility.115
bound in servitude to noble Somali families and are considered low-caste and subhuman
by other Somali clans”); Peterson v. Wilmur Commc’ns, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1014,
1015 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (discussing a particular church as allegedly teaching “that all
people of color are ‘savage’ and intent on ‘mongreliz[ing] the White Race,’ that African
Americans are subhuman and should be ‘ship[ped] back to Africa’ . . . .”).
112. See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 109, at 347.
113. For a partial inventory of such characterizations in the context of a valuable
exploration of the logic of human rights, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 58-59 (1998).
114. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
115. The degree, if any, to which Dante’s Satan, Milton’s Satan, or Goethe’s
Mephistopheles are genuinely capable of repentance has been subject to debate. Some
loosely relevant considerations are commonly addressed under what is called the doctrine of
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In such a case, the infidel or devil, however initially voluntarily, would
lack now and for the future the elements of Kantian dignity.
In some extreme cases, then, the basic Kantian logic of the grounds of
dignity and respect-worthiness would have no logical applicability to the
circumstances as supposedly understood by the hate speaker. The
Kantian approach would require modification to address such cases.116
However, we can reasonably assume such cases to be rare, especially
among hate speakers who exhibit the sort of generalized animosity
toward their targets that presupposes their target’s capacity for moral
responsibility.
IV. SOME CONTEMPORARY TREATMENTS OF THE IDEA OF DIGNITY
For some contemporary writers, the idea of dignity retains an
important role in guiding moral and constitutional decisionmaking, with
the idea of dignity operating to unify rather than to rank persons.117 One
contemporary writer, for example, has urged that “[t]hose who try to
formulate substantial principles of justice should reserve a prominent
place for human dignity. If this is not done, the distinctively moral
aspects of justice will be absent; and the claims of justice will be at best
legalistic and at worst arbitrary.”118

apokatastasis. For historical background, see Edward Moore, Origen of Alexandria and
Apokatastasis: Some Notes on the Development of a Noble Notion, 5 QUODLIBET (2003),
available at www.quodlibet.net/moore-origen.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
116. An alternative approach to adjudicating between free speech rights and equal
protection rights would shift the focus to an entirely different Kantian formulation. See
Donald L. Beschle, Kant’s Categorical Imperative: An Unspoken Factor in
Constitutional Rights Balancing, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 949, 954, 963-67 (2004) (focusing on
the famous Kantian injunction to never treat persons solely as a means, but always as
ends in themselves as well).
117. See, e.g., Michael S. Pritchard, Human Dignity and Justice, 82 ETHICS 299,
301 (1982); Herbert Spiegelberg, A Defense of Human Equality, 53 PHIL. REV. 101, 105
(1944) (noting equality in dignity as reflecting a basic commonality despite differences
in contribution).
118. Pritchard, supra note 117, at 300-01. Pritchard’s own suggestion is that “the
capacity for developing a sense of dignity is itself a sufficient reason for attributing
human dignity to persons.” Id. at 312. This approach faces several problems. Our
“reactive attitudes” and the survival advantage of developing a subjective sense of
entitlement to respect could persist even if there were no underlying basis to the utterly
deluded idea that we genuinely possess dignity. Our success in battle, based partly on
our belief that we are aided by the gods, does not show that there are such gods. On the
other hand, the capacity to formulate any self-reflexive, self-conscious thought at all,
regardless of content, might itself amount to such an astonishing miracle as to confer
basic dignity. The capacity to take a conscientious stand on any question at all may
actually imply the elements of dignity. See supra Part II.
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The idea of the dignity of the person pervades basic modern international
legal documents119 and appears explicitly in some recently drafted national
constitutions.120 The legal documents, however, generally do not attempt
to define, describe, or account for the dignity of the person.121 They thus
do not in themselves clarify the idea of dignity.
To help clarify contemporary general ideas of dignity, we may start
with synonyms and related ideas. It is thus said that “nothing is so
clearly violative of the dignity of persons as treatment that demeans or
humiliates them.”122 This may help account for why hate speech may be
said to be contrary to human dignity. The idea of the demeaning or the
humiliating seems more vivid, more concrete, and more emotionally
infused than the abstract idea of dignity. The positive but abstract idea
of promoting human dignity, by itself, can guide our actions and policies
only so far.123
Beyond recourse to synonyms, some writers have attempted to
construct typologies that reflect our contemporary thinking about
dignity. One contemporary writer, for example, has suggested a fourpart typology.124 The first meaning of dignity on this typology is the dignity
of what is referred to as merit.125 This sense of dignity is applied to
those who hold some office of distinctively high rank or status, gained
either through achievement or through birth and inheritance.126 This first
sense of dignity has little direct relationship to most important contested
issues of liberty and equality and can thus safely be ignored for our
purposes.
119. See Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L
L. 848, 848 (1983).
120. See id. at 848 n.2; Izhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern
Israel’s Constitutional Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1903, 1926-27 (2000).
121. See Schachter, supra note 119, at 849.
122. Id. at 850. Covering somewhat different ground, but to related effect, the
philosopher James W. Nickel has argued that “[w]e respect a person’s dignity when we
protect his life and agency and when we prevent others from imposing treatment that is
severely degrading or unfair.” James W. Nickel, Poverty and Rights, 55 PHIL. Q. 385,
394 (2005). We can perhaps see why merely mildly unfair treatment might not be an
invariable affront to human dignity. But why does “degrading” treatment, even if not at
the level of “severely degrading” treatment, not potentially affront human dignity?
123. See Aurel Kolnai, Dignity, in DIGNITY, CHARACTER AND SELF-RESPECT, 53, 55
(Robin S. Dillon ed., 1995) (“In contrast with moral approval as such, [dignity] has little,
if anything, to do with . . . ‘action-guiding’ rule-obedience in any direct sense.”).
124. Lennart Nordenfelt, The Varieties of Dignity, 12 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 69
(2004).
125. See id. at 71.
126. See id.
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The second sense of dignity is that of a person’s particularized moral
stature, either high or low. Dignity in this sense is crucially reflective of
the character, thoughts, and deeds of the person in accordance with
presumed moral law.127 Although to comport oneself with dignity in this
sense is admirable, it is difficult to see how the typical epithet hurler
advances dignity, in this sense, in either the target of the hate speech or
in the hate speaker himself. How engaging in hate speech sets a shining
example for others to imitate would on such a theory of dignity remain
mysterious. It is simply too difficult to adjudicate between free speech
and equality in the hate speech context through a sense of dignity that is
enhanced in neither the hate speaker nor the target.
The third sense of dignity is likewise important in certain contexts, but
cannot be generally decisive in the hate speech context. This sense is
that of the dignity of one’s self or one’s identity, or the dignity of
continuity of identity.128 While difficult to clarify, the idea here refers
roughly to preservation of the integrity of a unified self, integrated and
continuous across time and across personal relationships. In extreme
cases, social rejection and deprivation might tend to undermine this
dignity of identity.129 Some persisting instances of hate speech could
perhaps lead some targets to question their worthiness and dignity. But
the dignity of identity is more central to societal treatment of the very
young, the very old, and the severely physically and mentally ill than to
the targets of typical hate speech.130
The fourth and final sense of dignity bears much more directly and
usefully on hate speech problems. This fourth sense is intended to
capture most of the contemporary variants of the basic Kantian and
international senses of dignity.131 The idea is roughly that a sense exists
in which dignity is neither gained nor lost by any person’s distinctive
achievement or failure and is held equally by all.132 The grounds of
dignity are thought to be one or more crucial qualities held not merely
by all persons, but by all persons in permanently equal measure. The
existence of a rational capacity, a capacity for autonomy, freedom,
127. See id. at 72.
128. See id. at 74-75.
129. See id. at 75. It then becomes an empirical question whether hate speech, or
more realistically a sustained campaign or even a dominant culture of hate speech, could
undermine core beliefs and capacities of target group members. One respondent to
Nordenfelt argues that “[h]umiliation works by undermining the victim’s own values, so
that he or she is no longer able to judge themselves positively or to create a meaningful
narrative of their own lives.” Andrew Edgar, A Response to Nordenfelt’s “The Varieties
of Dignity,” 12 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 83, 87 (2004).
130. See Nordenfelt, supra note 124, at 74.
131. See id. at 77-79.
132. See id. at 78.
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plasticity, indeterminacy of nature, the presence consciousness, or selfconsciousness might well be thought to serve as such grounds.133
Dignity in this fourth sense has the greatest potential for adjudicating
between free speech and equal protection. But dignity in this most
useful sense is actually a family of only partial theories. It is hardly
clear, for example, that all of the possible grounds of dignity cited
immediately above134 individually carry enough moral weight and
relevant significance to be adequate to the adjudicatory task.135 But
there is also the problem of whether they are all found equally in all
persons, or else more in some persons than others.136
We must also ask whether the talk of equal dignity of persons, with
its comparative quantitative overtones, is precisely what we want to
say. Should we instead be emphasizing dignity as uniqueness,
irreplaceability, inexchangeability, or incomparability, with an emphasis
on incommensurability?137 Equality is hardly the same thing as
incomparability. After all, things that are equal to one another may or
may not be substituted for one another without losing meaning and
value. So we must ask whether the differences between equal dignity
and incomparable or incommensurable dignity matter crucially in our
contexts.138
Other complications must also be addressed. What precise sorts of
acts are really in derogation of dignity? The legal philosopher R.A. Duff
offers a negative typology of “degradation,” rather than positively of dignity,
that focuses on modes of degrading.139 Professor Duff distinguishes four
modes of degradation. These include, first, “performative degradation,” as
for example in the institutional act of ceremonially stripping a military
officer of an attained rank.140 The second mode is “consequential
degradation,” as when the economic system operates to degrade longterm unemployed job seekers, where such an effect might not be
consciously intended by those who operate the economic system.141
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See supra Part III.
136. See Nordenfelt, supra note 124, at 78.
137. See id.
138. See id. But cf. powell, supra note 25 (discussing an alternative focus on the
value of participation).
139. R.A. Duff, Punishment, Dignity and Degradation, 25 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 141,
149-51 (2005); cf. supra notes 29-42 (triangulating dignity negatively).
140. See Duff, supra note 139, at 149.
141. See id. at 149-50.
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In contrast, Professor Duff’s third category of degradation involves
not necessarily actual degradation, but treatment by others as if one were
of a lower rank.142 This counterfactual degradation is referred to as
“expressive degradation.”143 Whether “expressive” degrading treatment
can actually degrade the victim is left unclear,144 but there is no obvious
reason why expressive degradation could not be combined with intended
consequential degradation,145 as when a person is subjected to a
humiliating caste system.
Professor Duff’s fourth mode of degradation is subjective in nature. It
is a matter of psychologically feeling degraded.146 Professor Duff
rightly observes that “feeling degraded is neither necessary nor sufficient
for being degraded.”147 One might feel degraded only because of one’s
bloated self-esteem. And there are on the other hand persons who have
been degraded without recognizing it.148 Degradation and indignity, as
well as inequality and lack of freedom, can exist without being recognized
or objected to by their victims.149
142. See id. at 150.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 150 n.21.
145. See id. at 149-50.
146. See id. at 150.
147. Id. (emphasis in original).
148. Other than the literary case of Quasimodo, see supra note 79 and accompanying
text, we can think of ethnic slurs not understood by non-English speakers, or the obvious
gap between the objective and subjective perception requirements in Title VII workplace
harassment cases. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile
or abusive work environment . . . is beyond Title VII’s purview. Likewise, if
the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the
conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim’s employment,
and there is no Title VII violation.
Id.; Anna-Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the
Construction of Sexual Harassment Policies, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 83, 95 (2005)
(quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22).
It is far from clear, however, that in the cases above, no degrading treatment
has taken place if the victim fails to subjectively recognize that the treatment is
indeed degrading. Suppose an owner hires a young woman precisely in the
hopes that she is naïve and inexperienced enough to fail to appreciate the
unusual, and unusually degrading, nature of the treatment to which she is
subjected. Should we say that the otherwise degrading treatment she receives
is not degrading, because only a more experienced worker would have
recognized it as degrading and objected? In contrast, the related idea of
humiliation may have a more indispensable subjective element.
Id.; see also Daniel Statman, Humiliation, Dignity and Self-Respect, 13 PHIL. PSYCHOL.
523, 532 (2000).
149. For further extensive discussion of the idea of degradation, mostly in the
context of references to degradation, torture, or inhuman treatment under the European
Convention on Human Rights and with particular application to criminal punishment, see
John Vorhaus, On Degradation. Part One: Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, 31 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 374 (2002) and John Vorhaus, On Degradation.
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Professor Duff’s negative typology of the forms of degradation is
useful, and the various contemporary typologies and accounts of dignity
in general enrich our understanding. It seems fair to say, however, that
the best contemporary accounts still depend crucially upon the classical
elements articulated by Kant. The grounds of dignity, however we
choose to elaborate upon them, must preserve something of the absolute,
incomparable, and inalienable, as well as the universal equality associated
with Immanuel Kant’s approach.
To illustrate this point, consider the contemporary work of John
Rawls, which focuses not on dignity but on self-respect and on the social
bases thereof.150 Not surprisingly, Rawls emphasizes the subjective or
psychological dimensions involved.151 But he recognizes that “selfrespect normally depends upon the respect of others.”152 We generally
need validation by others, along with certain material and social
conditions, to sustain our sense of the value of our own efforts.153 For
such reasons, Rawls argues that the parties in his original position would
agree upon a “natural duty of mutual respect”154 requiring mutually civil
treatment155 for the sake of advancing their own particular projects and
purposes, whatever they turn out to be.
It is not clear how much weight Rawls wishes to place on this precontractualist natural duty of mutual respect, and how much on an
acceptance of that duty by the contracting parties. But there is also
something paradoxical, if not self-defeating, about an ex ante agreement
among persons to genuinely esteem the purposes and projects of other
people. Can we agree in advance to be genuinely impressed by what we
do not now foresee? Can a party guest agree in advance to genuinely
like a new appetizer?
We may all be better off in a pragmatic sense if we at least pretend to
esteem and validate each other’s purposes and projects. But how much
will a person’s self-esteem be enhanced if he knows that social support
Part Two: Degrading Treatment and Punishment, 32 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 65
(2003).
150. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 440 (1971).
151. See id.
152. See id. at 178.
153. See id.; see also Bertram Morris, The Dignity of Man, 57 ETHICS 57, 57 (1946)
(“I wish to emphasize the indispensability of man’s social relationships, as pertaining to
our belief in his dignity and as giving positive content to that notion.”).
154. RAWLS, supra note 150, at 179.
155. See id.
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of his projects is really driven by a sense of duty, or a contractual
obligation, or even by a shared desire for the best social outcome? For
the esteem of others to be genuinely meaningful, it would have to reflect
at least partly sincere appraisal of something like the particular merits of
his projects. Rawls’ insistence on civility and mutual respect is certainly
praiseworthy, but he has not contributed substantially to the underlying
logic of genuine respect or civility, in hate speech or any other
context.156
Some contemporary writers have taken a significantly different approach
to dignity. Professor Robert Goodin makes the classical observation that
“we respect people’s choices . . . because we respect people and their
innate dignity.”157 The linkage between freedom and dignity in Goodin’s
formulation is more explicit than the relationship between equality and
dignity, but there is a classic, traditionalist logic supporting this structure.158
Interestingly, Professor Goodin argues that, as an object of respect,
dignity differs significantly from the authority of the Queen or the
equality of persons.159 The Queen’s authority and the equality of persons
exist independently of and precede the decision to respect them.160
Human dignity supposedly does not. Goodin asserts that human dignity
is mysteriously created, or conjured into being in the first place, by the
very act of respecting it.161
For Professor Goodin, this curious result only adds to the importance
of human dignity. He interprets this to mean that human dignity is a
basic presupposition within our ethical and legal beliefs.162 As a a
logically primitive premise, it cannot be directly argued for or directly
supported by other beliefs.163 In contrast, we could easily imagine that
qualities such as self-consciousness, the capacity for autonomy, or the
capacity for free choice should play a crucial role in accounting for the
idea of dignity. Professor Goodin’s conclusion that human dignity is an
axiom and that dignity comes paradoxically into existence only in the
very act of being respected leaves such dignity in a precarious position.

156. For a broader critique, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 214
(1974) (“One doubts that the unexalted picture of human beings Rawls’ theory
presupposes and rests upon can be made to fit together with the view of human dignity it
is designed to lead to and embody.”).
157. Robert E. Goodin, The Political Theories of Choice and Dignity, 18 AM. PHIL.
Q. 91, 91 (1981); see also id. at 94.
158. In addition to dignity, Goodin also explores ideas of autonomy, capacity for
choice, and the capacity for reflexive self-consciousness. See id. at 96.
159. See id. at 97.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
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If we choose not to respect and thereby not to conjure up human dignity,
no one’s dignity is violated.
Can someone have a right to have their human dignity created in the
first place?164 That seems rather question-begging. On what grounds
would we recognize such a right? Dignitary grounds? On what grounds
would we decide whether to bring someone’s dignity into being if we
can offer no direct argument for the value of dignity? That doing so might
somehow pay off? In literally all cases? How would we know the likely
consequences of creating this utterly distinctive sort of boot-strapped
dignity? In contrast, if we have reason to think that dignity is something
that persons have and that is worthy of our respect for actual reasons, the
case for respecting dignity become less arbitrary.165 History surely
teaches that dignity can go disrespected or unrecognized on any scale.
More dramatic that Professor Goodin’s approach is the decision of
some contemporary pragmatists to drain the metaphysics from all talk of
personal dignity. This course is taken for the sake of avoiding confusion
and for some presumed pragmatic payoff. Professor Richard Rorty has
taken this tack generally, and with specific regard to dignity.166
Professor Rorty has argued that, ironically, universal human dignity
claims simply speak favorably of some group with which one identifies,
relative to some other contrasting group.167
Such claims raise large issues,168 and Professor Rorty has not been
without his critics on this point.169 We need not for our purposes rule
out either Goodin’s or Rorty’s approaches in principle. Our goal is to
164. There may well be senses of dignity, such as exalted status or rank, in which
anyone who has fully met the established prerequisites would then hold an entitlement to
have the corresponding dignity conferred.
165. For further discussion of some possible relationships between dignity and the
possession of rights, see Michael J. Meyer, Dignity, Rights, and Self-Control, 99 ETHICS
520 (1989).
166. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH 312 (1991).
167. See Richard Rorty, Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism, 80 J. PHIL. 583, 58687 (1983).
168. See, e.g., R. George Wright, Pragmatism and Freedom of Speech, 80 N.D. L.
REV. 103 (2004).
169. See, e.g., Jean Bethke Elshtain, The Equality of Persons and the Culture of
Right, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5, 10 (2003) (“Radical conventionalism of the sort Rorty
advances affords no guarantee of human equality and dignity, hence a culture of rights.
Indeed, Rorty here provides a compelling reason for why none of us would wish to live
in a world of arbitrary redescription.”); Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights:
A Non-Religious Ground?, 54 EMORY L.J. 97, 147-48 (2005) (emphasizing the ceilinglevel status for Rorty of mere divergent social practices, competing stories, preferences,
and sentiments, as opposed to more traditional human rights discourse).
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use human dignity to adjudicate among free speech and equal protection
claims. Rorty may pragmatize the idea of dignity in a way that eventually
reduces its practical impact. But Rorty’s pragmatism may also reduce
the metaphysical weight of both freedom of speech and equal protection.
Perhaps some proportionality among all three considerations would then
remain.170 Perhaps dignity, freedom, and equality can all thus happily be
metaphysically miniaturized. At this point we are possibly better off
erring on the side of inclusion than by simply excluding either Goodin’s
or Rorty’s approach.171
For purposes of fairly adjudicating between freedom of speech and
equal protection, we need not precisely pin down any unique meaning of
the idea of dignity. Perhaps more than one specific understanding of
dignity can properly accommodate and adjudicate between free speech
and equal protection. What we require of any such understanding of
dignity will, however, unavoidably involve several elements. Most
importantly, the particular understanding of dignity involved must seem
sufficiently weighty, or sufficiently fundamental, to legitimately tip the
balance or otherwise resolve cases in which free speech and equal
protection conflict.

170. Whether a consistent Rortyan pragmatism would leave things as they are, or
even proportionately miniaturized, may be doubted. It seems more likely that the
impulse to substantially redistribute resources over time, in a genuinely sacrificial way,
from the well off to those less well off, would be especially vulnerable if all groups are
reduced to telling stories not aspiring to metaphysical truth. See generally Wright, supra
note 168.
171. Other discussions can be indirectly valuable to our own inquiry, though with a
focus on a sense of dignity differing from our own. See, e.g., AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE
DECENT SOCIETY 51 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996) (stating that as distinguished from
self-esteem, “[d]ignity is the tendency to behave in a dignified manner which attests to
one’s self-respect.”); cf. id. at 44 (“[R]espect constitutes a ground for treating people
equally, while esteem forms a basis for ranking people.”); Timothy P. Jackson, The
Image of God and the Soul of Humanity: Reflections on Dignity, Sanctity, and
Democracy, in RELIGION IN THE LIBERAL POLITY 43, 52 (Terence Cuneo ed., 2005) (“If
‘dignity’ is identified with the achieved merit of mature selves, then ‘sanctity’ refers to a
gratuitous legacy owned equally by all souls.”) (emphasizing the universality of the need
for and the ability to flourish only if accorded unconditional care or agapic love); see id.
at 64. For a brief review of Religion in the Liberal Polity, see John J. Davenport, Book
Review, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REV. (2005), http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=3061 (last
visited Oct. 1, 2006). Finally, there is Stephen Darwall’s distinction between “recognition
respect,” the consideration owed to all persons, and “appraisal respect,” which is accorded to
distinctive excellence. See Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36, 3839, 46 (1977). Darwall explains,
The distinction between appraisal respect and recognition respect . . . enables
us to see that there is no puzzle at all in thinking both that all persons are
entitled to respect just by virtue of their being persons and that persons are
deserving of more or less respect by virtue of their personal characteristics.
Id. at 46.
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The particular idea of dignity involved must also reflect our common
constitutional belief in basic human equality while at the same time not
automatically validating the equal protection claim in any conflict with
freedom of speech. The idea of dignity must be attributable in full and
equal measure to all persons. A constitutional democracy cannot allow
for a graded hierarchy of the basic dignity of persons. Yet the idea of
dignity must also feed naturally into and help account for the value we
attach to freedom of speech. We must be able to see general censorship,
for example, as contrary to dignity in the relevant sense, and silencing of
conscience as humiliating. These requirements rule out relying on any
sense of dignity in which it is more dignified to be, say, a powerful or
high-ranking official than a lower-ranking official or ordinary citizen.172
Furthermore, from among the otherwise eligible particular understandings
of dignity, we would prefer those that are the least generally controversial in
their own theoretical assumptions. Thus, among otherwise acceptable
particular theories of dignity, those based on narrowly sectarian or
otherwise unnecessarily restricted grounds should be disfavored.
Even a theory of dignity as widely influential as Immanuel Kant’s can
be critiqued to some degree on the latter grounds. Kant, after all, wants
to focus not on what he calls our empirical or psychological personality,
but on our presumed and admittedly controversial ability to act
“independently of the mechanisms of nature.”173 The human174 capacity
for self-consciousness, or for subjective awareness of our identity as a
self, is a matter of the empirical personality rather than of the rational
moral personality that is thought by Kant to transcend nature.175 Kant’s
theory of dignity seeks to avoid controversial religious commitments,176
but may itself still depend upon discerning “purpose” in nature itself.177
172. For an argument that freedom of speech is required to protect human dignity,
but that free speech can also undermine the dignity of subordinated persons in particular,
see Frederick Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS, supra note
2, at 178-79. For discussion of Schauer’s approach, see Norman Rosenberg, Dignity,
Rights, and Recent Scholarship, 45 AM. Q. 429, 431-32 (1993) (book review). It is
precisely the ability to invoke dignity in the same sense both for and against speech that
legitimizes its use as a balancing and adjudicating consideration in conflicts between free
speech and equal protection claims.
173. See, e.g., ROGER SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL THEORY 197 (1989).
174. This is not to suggest that members of the human species alone, excluding
other animals, can be persons or possess dignity in the relevant respect. See supra note 60.
175. See SULLIVAN, supra note 173, at 197.
176. See, for example, the classic religiously based theories of dignity discussed
supra Part III.
177. See, e.g., Shell, supra note 100, at 68-69.
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It may be that any otherwise suitable theory of dignity must be at least
as controversial in its assumptions as that of Kant. If so, this need not
unduly disturb us. Theories of freedom and equality are similarly
unavoidably controversial. We are seeking a theory of dignity for the
purposes of fairly adjudicating between the values of freedom of speech
and equal protection. Both freedom of speech178 and equal protection179
are themselves often thought to be based on premises as deep and
controversial as, if not identical to, the grounds of dignity itself.
Some contemporary accounts of dignity actually do attempt to capture
the breadth and force of Kant’s position, but without any ideas as
controversial as ultimate recourse to purposes in nature.180 Such
accounts unavoidably involve controversy of their own. Professor Alan
Gewirth, in particular, starts by assuming that every human is an “actual,
prospective, or potential agent . . . .”181 He then argues that as such, we
engage in or at least hold open the possibility of purposive action.182
Purposive action implies that the actor ascribes some sort of value to the
action undertaken, at least from the standpoint of that very actor.183 The
valuing of those actions implies that the actor must also value herself,184
at least as a reflective chooser whose choices are subjectively worth
pursuing. But this logic of valuation then applies not only to the
individual chooser herself, but equally to every other purposive actor
and to their own value.185 By Gewirth’s logic, each actor must therefore

178. See, for example, the understanding of self-realization at work in JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 75-118 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1982) (1859).
179. The justifications of the equality of persons, equal protection, and in particular
the equal dignity of persons are often ignored or simply taken for granted. For
discussion of the justification of equality, see, for example, JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK
M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL 33 (1999) (“[P]roperly understood, the capacity for
moral personality may not be a ‘range property’ at all but rather one that is uniform in
degree. And if it is uniform, it might be the host property for the relation of human
equality.”); JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY 78-79 (2002) (discussing
Locke as grounding equality of rights on each person’s equally possessing sufficient
ability to reason their way, without revelation, to a recognition of the existence of God
and the basic divine moral requirements); George P. Fletcher, God’s Image and
Egalitarian Politics, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 310 (2004) (concluding that neither John
Rawls nor Ronald Dworkin offers much of an account of why all persons should be
accorded equal respect in the substantive or procedural dimensions of justice). But cf.
Serena Olsaretti, Book Review, 114 MIND 750, 751-52 (2005) (reviewing JOHN KEKES,
THE ILLUSIONS OF EGALITARIANISM (2003)) (responding to Kekes’s claim that modern
egalitarianism is effectively groundless).
180. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
181. Gewirth, supra note 2, at 10, 22.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 21-22.
184. See id. at 22.
185. See id. at 23.
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regard all other reflective, purposive, choosing agents, along with herself,
“as having worth or dignity.”186
We need not endorse the full scope of Professor Gewirth’s argument
as rigorously carrying us to something akin to an egalitarian and robust
Kantian sense of human worth as beyond price and not subject to
comparison or exchange. Gewirth’s theory merely illustrates one approach
to human dignity that begins from relatively uncontroversial premises.
Other distinct approaches are certainly possible.187 And it is again difficult
to imagine that anyone can dismiss human dignity in any serious sense,
yet also take conflicts between free speech and equal protection to be as
deeply meaningful as we ordinarily do.188 On this assumption, we can
apply a suitable understanding of dignity to potential conflicts of free
speech and equal protection.
V. DIGNITY AND THE MEDIATION OF FREE SPEECH
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Some General Relationships Between Freedom and Equality
Any recourse to dignity to explain and resolve conflicts between free
speech and equal protection would be unnecessary if no such conflicts
186. Id. For a critique of Professor Gewirth’s argument, as well as of related work by
Professors Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, see Déirdre Dwyer, Beyond
Autonomy: The Role of Dignity in ‘Biolaw,’ 23 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 323 (2003). For
further critique, see generally GEWIRTH’S ETHICAL RATIONALISM (Edward Regis, Jr., ed., 1984).
187. Another approach, also egalitarian in its implications, focuses on the astonishing
deep inexplicability of human consciousness in general and self-consciousness in
particular. See, e.g., DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND 93, 106 (1996)
(“[C]onsciousness escapes the net of reductive explanation. No explanation given
wholly in physical terms can ever account for the emergence of conscious experience.”);
COLIN MCGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME: CONSCIOUS MINDS IN A MATERIAL WORLD 5
(1999) (“[T]he bond between the mind and the brain is a deep mystery. Moreover it is
an ultimate mystery, a mystery that human intelligence will never unravel.”); KEITH
WARD, GOD, CHANCE & NECESSITY 147 (1996) (“Consciousness . . . . is a mystery that
biology can never solve . . . .”); see also DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 22
(1991); OWEN FLANAGAN, CONSCIOUSNESS RECONSIDERED xi (1992); Thomas Nagel,
What Is It Like To Be a Bat?, 83 PHIL. REV. 435, 435 (1974).
With decidedly more metaphysical baggage, the medieval writer Gregory of Nyassa
sought to turn “a philosophical failure into a theological triumph by claiming that the
very unfathomability of the human mind is an imitation of the unfathomability of the
divine mind and a consequence of man’s having been formed in God’s image.” Richard
C. Dales, A Medieval View of Human Dignity, 38 J. HIST. IDEAS 557, 562 (1977). For
concision see BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, On Loving God, in SELECTED WORKS 173, 176
(G.R. Evans trans., 1987) (“Man’s dignity is his free will.”).
188. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
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ever arose. Unfortunately, such conflicts are in fact sometimes genuine
and unavoidable, along with broader conflicts between valuable forms of
freedom and equality in general.
One might argue that “freedom and equality, far from being opposed
ideals, actually coincide.”189 Concepts of “oppression,” of political
dominance and subordination, or of civil rights and liberation movements
clearly involve allied themes of freedom and equality.190 Yet when an
employer seeks to raise a free speech defense to claims of unequal
treatment on grounds of sex,191 we must say more than that the employer
simply does not know how to apply the dictionary meanings of freedom
and equality.
Part of the problem of the relations between freedom and equality is
the number of important dimensions of freedom.192 There may be
empirical as well as normative dimensions in measuring and assessing
freedom.193 Freedom may also have instrumental as well as intrinsic
value.194 Equality, no less than freedom, may take on a plurality of
competing values and meanings.195
Thus we may well face circumstances in which either freedom or
equality must be somehow traded off against itself. These tradeoffs may
be unavoidable even if we can still somehow conclude that we have
chosen an outcome that maximizes freedom, or an outcome that
maximizes equality. Some persons may have less freedom because of a
policy that increases freedom overall.196 But tradeoffs within valuable
forms of freedom and within valuable forms of equality will be
inevitable.197
189. RICHARD NORMAN, FREE AND EQUAL 133 (1987).
190. See id. (positing that a struggle against oppression may equally be presented as
a struggle for freedom or for equality).
191. The following provide illustrations of such genuine conflicts, however anyone
wishes to resolve them: Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1246-47 (10th
Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Boyler v. Cordant Techs., Inc., 316 F.3d
1137, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003); Greene v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763 (D.
Md. 2005); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1534-37 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (discussing and ultimately rejecting seven distinct asserted free speech
challenges to a Title VII employment discrimination case).
192. See, e.g., IAN CARTER, A MEASURE OF FREEDOM 23, 43, 146, 163, 290-91
(1999). See generally FELIX E. OPPENHEIM, DIMENSIONS OF FREEDOM (1961).
193. See CARTER, supra note 192, at 146, 163; MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE QUALITY
OF FREEDOM 387 (2003) (discussing overall freedom as partly evaluative).
194. See CARTER, supra note 192, at 291.
195. See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN ET AL., THE CLASH OF RIGHTS 244 (1996) (“Equality
itself is a plurality of values, inviting not merely different but conflicting
understandings.”); R.M. Hare, Liberty and Equality: How Politics Masquerades as
Philosophy, in LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 1, 3 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1985).
196. See, e.g., T.M. WILKINSON, FREEDOM, EFFICIENCY AND EQUALITY 77-78
(2000).
197. See CHRISTINE SWANTON, FREEDOM 190 (1992).
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Nor can we entirely avoid conflicts between valuable understandings
of freedom and equality. There will be tradeoffs between, say, meaningful
economic freedoms of one sort or another, and many forms of economic
equality.198 More generally, and despite their frequent mutual supportiveness
in crucial respects, “freedom and equality . . . coexist in a state of
tension . . . .”199 Meaningful conflicts, the best resolution of which may
be controversial, are thus at times inevitable.200
This conclusion is unavoidable unless either freedom or equality is
redefined in some way that precludes conflicts. There can be no
principled objection to redefining any term if the value of doing so is
sufficient. But redefining a crucial term such as liberty or equality may
well impose costs beyond those of confusion.
The contemporary legal theorist who most famously minimizes
disturbing conflicts between liberty and equality is Professor Ronald
Dworkin.201 Professor Dworkin rightly notes that we can define liberty
or freedom in a number of different ways, depending upon what we aim
to accomplish through our definition.202 As Professor Dworkin recognizes,
our political culture thinks of freedom in terms of the absence of
obstacles, generally socially or culturally imposed obstacles, to the
exercise of deliberation and choice.203 And as Professor Dworkin appreciates,

Id.

The choice about which freedoms to foster is a social choice, and the way it is
made will determine whether the society is dominated by the pursuit of virtue,
the cult of the market, the revolutionary spirit, the advocacy of self-criticism,
and so on. . . . [T]he model is societal self-creation of value through choice
among an adequate and reasonable set of incommensurable options.

198. See Jan Narveson, Equality vs. Liberty: Advantage, Liberty, in LIBERTY AND
EQUALITY, supra note 195, at 33, 34.
199. JOHN KEKES, THE MORALITY OF PLURALISM 54 (1993). Kekes states, more
controversially, that “the more we have of one, the less we can have of the other.” Id.
But it seems possible, as in the case of some liberation movements, to dramatically
increase crucial freedoms and equality overall at the same time. See, e.g., WILKINSON,
supra note 196, at 5-7.
200. This was a major theme of Lord Isaiah Berlin. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166, 200-03 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002); see also David B.
Wong, Coping with Moral Conflict and Ambiguity, 102 ETHICS 763, 770 n.16 (1992)
(citing Two Concepts of Liberty, supra).
201. For a general formulation, see Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal
Equality, in EQUAL FREEDOM 190, 194 (Stephen Darwall ed., 1995).
202. For Professor Dworkin’s most specific discussion of such, see Ronald
Dworkin, Do Liberal Values Conflict?, in THE LEGACY OF ISAIAH BERLIN 73 (Mark Lilla
et al. eds., 2001).
203. See id. at 83-84.
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freedom in this familiar sense may well conflict with equality as
conventionally defined.204
Professor Dworkin then asks, however, why we should feel bound by
that familiar sort of definition of freedom. He crucially suggests that
“liberty isn’t the freedom to do whatever you might want to do; it’s
freedom to do whatever you like so long as you respect the moral rights,
properly understood, of others.”205 This amounts to a moralized, and in
some sense a correct or objective, morality based definition of freedom.
Thus, if hurling a racial epithet at a passing student violates the moral
rights of the target, no freedom is lost by restricting the speaker. The
speaker by definition suffers no relevant and significant loss of freedom.
What we might otherwise see as a conflict between the speaker’s
freedom and the target’s own freedom and equality rights would be
short-circuited. The conflict never arises, with the key determination
being the scope of the target’s genuine moral rights.
We can for present purposes assume with Dworkin that there are
objective,206 and presumably recognizable, moral rights. It will
nevertheless seem odd to say with Dworkin that we cannot tell whether
confining an unconsenting person limits that person’s freedom of
movement until we have properly assessed the confined person’s moral
rights. Whether the person’s freedom has been restricted in accordance
with their actual moral rights seems a different and open question.
However, the basic problem with Professor Dworkin’s redefinition of
freedom, including presumably of freedom of speech, is that it
exchanges something of value for an insufficient return. Calling our
decision to respect or not respect someone else’s moral rights a matter of
our socially free choice may be important to our sense of social
responsibility and, indeed, to our own dignity as persons. If we do not
have a socially free choice between respecting and violating the moral
rights of others, we are therein diminished as persons.
Think also in terms of our sheer capacity for action. Suppose we
chose, freely or not, to have our brains rewired so that we were
prevented, at the last possible moment, from violating anyone’s moral
rights. Our target’s moral rights would certainly be more secure. But, as
above, our loss of social freedom and dignity, whatever the remaining
alternative vocabulary, would be substantial. We would still have to
debate and ascertain the proper scope of everyone’s moral rights.

204. See id.
205. Id.
206. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 87 (1996).
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Dworkin’s scheme is odd because we would have to somehow delimit
everyone’s moral rights with no reliance on the crucial idea of freedom.
A less ambitious but also less problematic approach would concede
the possibility of conflicts between valuable forms of freedom and
equality, but would argue that such conflicts can be minimized in a
properly ordered society. Professor Kai Nielsen, for example, argues
broadly that “it is only in an egalitarian society that full and extensive
liberty is possible.”207 But Professor Nielsen’s version of radical
egalitarianism would inevitably restrict some plainly valued liberties and
rights to noninterference.208 In this sense, genuine and substantial
conflicts between freedom and equality are inescapable. Nielsen’s
argument, however, is that radical egalitarianism’s restrictions on some
freedoms can be better justified than the restrictions on freedoms
necessarily required by any competing system.209 This is certainly
possible. Focusing on dignity might well help properly adjudicate such
claims, but further addressing Professor Nielsen’s broad-scale views on
the merits is beyond the scope of this Article.
Despite the inevitable conflicts between freedom and inequality, there
is an equally inescapable sense that dignity is somehow related to both.
It seems reasonable to suppose that respect for the dignity of persons
requires that we treat persons as equals in at least some important
respects.210 At the same time, respect for dignity also seems to require at
least some scope for important individual freedom and judgment.211 The
idea that dignity is strongly linked to both freedom and equality has also
been explicitly recognized.212 We take up some of these linkages in the
free speech context immediately below.
207. KAI NIELSEN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY 302 (1985). Similar themes constitute
the utopian vision of EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD (Daniel H. Borus ed., St.
Martin’s Press 1995) (1888).
208. See NIELSEN, supra note 207, at 302-04.
209. See id.
210. See Schachter, supra note 119, at 851 (discussing more specific possible
views).
211. See Luis Recaséns-Siches, Dignity, Liberty, and Equality, in 1 EQUALITY AND
FREEDOM: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE JURISPRUDENCE 3, 9-10 (Gray Dorsey ed.,
1977) (“The idea of dignity of the human person necessarily implies the principle of
individual liberty.”).
212. See STANLEY I. BENN, A THEORY OF FREEDOM 117 (1988) (“[O]ne can derive
from the principle of respect for persons not only the principle of noninterference, but
also a principle of equal consideration for the interests of persons.”). Thus, Professor
Benn concludes that genuine respect for persons, or for dignity, implies at least some
degree of respect for some forms of liberty as well as equality.

563

WRIGHT.DOC

11/9/2006 4:01 PM

B. Freedom of Speech, Hate Speech, the Equal Protection of
the Laws, and the Dignity of the Person
Racially charged and other forms of epithet speech are notoriously
common on public university campuses and other spaces subject to both
free speech and equal protection requirements.213 A crucial problem in
legally addressing such hate speech, however, is the unresolved status of
the relationship between freedom and equality discussed above.214 The
uncertain relationship between freedom and equality generally translates
into uncertainty between protecting free speech, including hate speech,
and promoting equal protection. Thus we find parallel contrasts of
views in the free speech versus equal protection contexts. One scholar
asks:
Does the speech right protect precisely the same human characteristics that
underlie the goals of social equality? If so, then suppressing speech as a means
of achieving social equality is a logical impossibility. . . . [and] the Equal
Protection Clause cannot be understood to dominate—or even to clash with—
free speech protection.215

It is thus argued that restricting speech can neither expand freedom of
speech nor promote the equal protection of the laws.
In contrast, “[t]he . . . charge issued by radical critics is aimed at the
liberal system of free expression, and the heart of the accusation is that
the system unduly obstructs efforts to eliminate oppressive inequalities
rooted in sex and race.”216 The “heroic” free speech ideal under “the
guise of liberty, neutrality, and openness . . . reinforces existing social
and political relationships of dominance and subordination and thus
legitimates prejudice and inequality.”217 Such formulations thus emphasize
213. See, e.g., Michelle Boorstein, Slurs at U-Va. Undermine Efforts to Thwart
Racism, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2005, at B01, available at www.washingtonpost.com/
wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/21/AR2005092102324.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2006);
Susan Kinzie, Racist Incidents Unnerve U-Va., WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2005, at B01,
available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005091601896pf.html
(last visited Oct. 1, 2006) (“Just a few weeks into the school year, U-Va. has had at least
nine racist incidents—slurs shouted from cars, ugly words written on message boards, a
racist threat scrawled on a bathroom wall.”).
214. See supra Part V.A.
215. John M. Blim, Undoing Our Selves: The Error of Sacrificing Speech in the
Quest for Equality, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 427, 430-31 (1995).
216. Andrew Altman, Equality and Expression: The Radical Paradox, 21 SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2004) (“[I]t is now claimed that the liberal state’s strong protection
of expressive liberty creates indefensible obstacles to the pursuit of racial and sexual
equality.”).
217. Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First Amendment: Racist Speech and Equal
Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 119, 140 (1991). It is worthwhile to refer to the sustained
and developed arguments of Professor Richard Delgado. Richard Delgado, Are HateSpeech Rules Constitutional Heresy? A Reply to Steven Gey, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 865,
865 (1998) (“[I]nterests of equality and dignity might sometimes justify limits on what
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the conflicts between some conceptions of free speech and of equal
protection of the laws.
Not surprisingly, some analysts recognize free speech218 and autonomy219
values on both sides of the hate speech versus equal protection conflict,
as in the broader debate over freedom and equality.220 Overall, the
conflicts we see in the broader debate over freedom and equality are
replicated in the narrower context of freedom of speech and the equal
protection of the laws. In the free speech-equal protection cases, it
remains appropriate to look to our understandings of the dignity of
persons to assist us in more fully understanding and resolving the
inevitable conflicts.221
In the campus hate speech context, a number of arguments have been
widely offered in opposition to hate speech regulation.222 We can
address such concerns only very briefly and selectively, merely to
may be said.”); cf. Steven G. Gey, Postmodern Censorship Revisited: A Reply to Richard
Delgado, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1077 (1998). For further reference, see Richard Delgado,
Making Pets: Social Workers, “Problem Groups,” and the Role of the SPCA—Getting a
Little More Precise About Racialized Narratives, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1571, 1580 (1999)
(“In the controversy over hate speech . . . a free-speech narrative is often developed in a
way that advances and encodes white privilege, while cutting short discussion of
countervailing equality values.”); Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves
and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech
Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871, 888 (1994) (“The strongest reason for enacting hate
speech rules on campuses with a history of disruption is that they are necessary to
promote equality.”); Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance: Freedom of
Expression and Hate-Speech Restriction, 78 IOWA L. REV. 737, 750 (1993) (discussing
the hypothesis of reciprocal tension and dependence between freedom and equality in
this context).
218. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Civil Liberties, Silencing, and Subordination, in
THE PRICE WE PAY, supra note 9, at 272, 273 (“The point of raising the issue of silencing
is to justify restrictions on freedom of expression in the name of the one value we cannot
conceivably rank below freedom of expression, namely, freedom of expression.”);
Stefancic & Delgado, supra note 217.
219. See Michelman, supra note 218 (stating “we have autonomy values on both sides”).
220. See supra Part V.A.
221. For a sense of some of the conflicts, and an attempt at a defensible
compromise position, see Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The
Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 248-50 (1991) (articulating an
“accommodationist” middle ground position).
222. Among the most concise and comprehensive listings of such concerns are
those by Nadine Strossen. See Nadine Strossen, Hate Speech and Pornography: Do We
Have to Choose Between Freedom of Speech and Equality?, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
449 (1996); Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and Equality: The American
Civil Liberties Union Past, Present, and Future, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 143, 15051 (1994). Some of Professor Strossen’s concerns parallel those commonly raised
against clearly progressive reforms such as affirmative action programs.
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illustrate the possible role of dignity-based considerations.
responses to such arguments are to be found elsewhere.223
It has been argued, for example, that hate speech bans

Broader

may reinforce the paternalistic assumption that individuals belonging to certain
marginalized groups cannot talk back for themselves, may turn racists into
libertarian martyrs, may treat only the symptoms of prejudice while leaving the
underlying attitudes untouched, and may open the door to the punishment of
unpopular speech.224

From the standpoint of the fundamental dignity of the parties, recall
Immanuel Kant’s repeated condemnation of disrespect in the form of
contemptuous mockery or scoffing,225 such as to rule out epithet speech
as incompatible with the dignity of the person. If mere “scoffing” is
incompatible with fundamental dignity, how much more so must be the
kinds of vicious epithets involved in typical hate speech cases? In such
cases, Kantian-influenced understandings of dignity clearly tip the
constitutional balance in favor of equal protection as opposed to the free
speech rights of the epithet hurler. In this range of cases, on balance,
considerations of dignity determinately favor considerations of equality
over the rights of a class of speakers. Considerations of basic dignity
guide the resolution of conflicting constitutional claims in ways that are
not only determinate, but broadly just and legitimate as well.
But let us presume that there is a paternalistic assumption that members
of “certain marginalized groups cannot talk back for themselves.”226
Let us match this assumed stereotype against the circumstances of common
sorts of campus hate speech incidents. Consider, for example, a slur
shouted from a passing car, targeting one or more pedestrians.227 The
target’s opportunities for a meaningful response, let alone a cogent
223. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?,
42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287 (1990); Michelman, supra note 218; powell, supra note 25.
224. Note, The Demise of the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument
for Its Interment, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1129, 1141 (1993). The Court in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 309-10 (1940)), urged that “‘[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any
proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution,
and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.’”
See also, e.g., Idaho v. Poe, 88 P.3d 704, 719 (Idaho 2004); In re M.J.M., 858 A.2d
1259, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 962 (Pa.
Super. 2002)). It is indeed far from clear how pure epithet speech implicates the values
or the logic underlying freedom of speech, of a dignitary sort or otherwise, in such a way
as to trigger significant free speech protection aside from the step at which dignitary and
other costs of epithet speech are taken into account. For recent discussion of Chaplinsky,
see Linda Friedlieb, The Epitome of an Insult: A Constitutional Approach to Designated
Fighting Words, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 385 (2005).
225. See supra Part III at text accompanying notes 89-92.
226. See supra text at note 224.
227. See supra note 213.
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rebuttal, or for any dialogue, are nonexistent. The impossibility of
any situational “talking back” is clear to all the parties. This effect is
presumably intended by epithet hurlers who drive away.
In fact, it would seem that many of the circumstances under which
epithets are expressed do not realistically allow any meaningful response
in context. Other than the “drive-by” variety, there may be, for example,
anonymous notes attached to one’s door or one’s vehicle, or graffiti in
public or private spaces.228 None of these media and contexts generally
permit direct personal response.
Thus in many of the common hate speech contexts, the idea of
stigmatizing the targets as passive and inexpressive, and thus in some
sense as lacking in dignity, simply has no basis in the circumstances.229
The dignity of the target of hate speech is in even this sense fully
implicated. In contrast, whether campus hate speech regulations might
create racist martyrs230 of any penalized hate speaker may depend on
whether a penalty is itself seen as humiliating and undignified or as
instead manifesting appropriate respect for the dignity of both the
speaker’s target and the speaker.231
Treating the symptoms of prejudice rather than underlying attitudes,232
at least in the context of speech regulation, may also reflect respect for
the underlying dignity of both speaker and target. The underlying
prejudiced attitudes may be addressed more effectively and with greater
respect for dignity by means that supplement, rather than substitute for,
appropriate speech regulation.233 In the meantime, hate speech targets
and neutral observers may value any respite from verbal assaults on the
targets’ dignity, even if this respite is a matter of merely unprejudiced
behavior rather than of unprejudiced underlying attitudes as well.234 In
228. See id.
229. It seems undeniable that targets of hate speech can and do offer various sorts of
responses to hate speech more indirectly. See id.
230. See supra text at note 224.
231. In the context of generally Kantian approaches to punishment, see Paul
Campos, The Paradox of Punishment, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1931, 1937, stating that “[f]or
Kant, punishing the criminal [in an appropriate way] accords him the respect due a
rational being.”
232. See supra text at note 224.
233. See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 472 (1958) (discussing
the importance of socialization in the home and in schools).
234. It has been observed that “attitudes do not necessarily translate into behaviors.”
Chad Trulson & James W. Marquart, The Caged Melting Pot: Toward an Understanding
of the Consequences of Desegregation in Prison, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 743, 748 (2002).
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fact, such targets may find symbolic value in the official repudiation of
hate speech, even if no speakers are sanctioned and no actual reduction
in hate speech occurs.235
Part of the problem also lies in the focus of some hate speech
regulation critics on broad conceptual categories such as offense,
possible offense, hurt feelings, or resentment.236 These broad categories
conceal important differences in intent and effect on dignity. It is
common to react with feelings of offense and resentment if one is
challenged by any sort of insulting language. Few persons would appreciate
being referred to as “snakes,” “bedbugs,” or “slimy scum.”237 Even mild
epithets, in the context of a political speech or not, and whether
addressed to one’s supporters or not, can be superficial assaults on the
dignity of those to whom the epithets refer.238
But such mild epithets generally have no wider and no deeper
resonance. In contrast, invidious racial and related epithets, deployed
hostilely and often without any pretense to an explicit argument, can
instantly evoke historical traditions of lawless violence, intimidation, and
brutalization.239 To refer to someone as a “snake” is clearly metaphor, and
at least faintly ludicrous. No recognizable cultural tradition is evoked by
any such reference. No emotively charged history is thereby conjured
up. No speaker genuinely expects to intimidate anyone by such language.
To thus fail to distinguish among instances of the broad category of
offensive or “nasty”240 language in their intent and in their effects on
dignity is neither governmental modesty241 nor a sensible avoidance of
slippery slopes and borderline cases.242
235. For discussion of the importance of various sorts of symbolism in politics, see,
for example, MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1985).
236. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J.,
concurring); Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215 (3d Cir. 2001)
(noting that even some speech widely perceived as offensive or even as gravely
offensive may not be proscribed (citing Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 863
(E.D. Mich. 1989) (university hate speech code))); Bair v. Shippensburg Univ., 280 F.
Supp. 2d 357 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (university speech code).
237. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 26 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
238. See id. at 17, 21. Speech may be offensive, even at some personal level, without
amounting to as clear an assault on the dignity of the offended persons. Consider the
circumstances of the public flag burning case of Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
239. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 388-91 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing, e.g., WYN C. WADE, THE FIERY CROSS: THE KU KLUX KLAN IN AMERICA 262-63
(1987); JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA’S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 19541965, at 39 (1987)); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 378 (1975).
240. See Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 11-12 (1991) (emphasizing the importance of avoiding any pretense of official
infallibility).
241. See id.
242. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile
Work Environment Harassment, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR L. 305, 313 (1996).
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There is some risk that hate speech regulations may be used against,
and not always for, individual members of the most historically
oppressed groups.243 As well, the dignitary effects of hate speech may
not be the same on all targets, largely because history and cultural tradition
have not treated all possible target groups equally. Some historically
conditioned aspects of dignity may thus suggest somewhat different hate
speech rules for different groups. These are complications, however, rather
than balance-shifting considerations. In the end, considerations of formal
equality under law,244 sheer political practicality, and the most stringent
demands of Kantian respect for the dignity of persons245 would all pull
strongly in favor of formally uniform hate speech rules for all groups.
C. Speech, Equality, and the Mediating Value of Dignity in the
Public School Confederate Flag Cases
Since the classic Tinker v. Des Moines Vietnam War protest case
decided in 1969,246 students of various ages have enjoyed free speech
rights in the public schools, limited on grounds such as predictable
disruption or interference with appropriate school discipline and
functioning or with the rights of others.247 These speech rights have
been further limited in cases in which the speech might reasonably be
thought of as specifically approved of by the school itself.248 But the
possibility of principled conflict between student speech and other
important values, such as general equality and civil rights protections,
equal educational rights, and sheer social civility, is certainly clear.249
Litigation involving such potential conflicts often arises with special
sharpness and import in the context of the display in public schools of
243. See, e.g., Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and Equality: The American
Civil Liberties Union Past, Present, and Future, supra note 222, at 151.
244. See, for example, the formal egalitarian absolutism of Justice Stewart
concurring in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (1967), stating “it is simply not possible
for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality of an act
depend upon the race of the actor.”
245. See supra Part III at text accompanying notes 89-92.
246. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
247. See id. at 514.
248. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-73 (1988); Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). On the unclear scope of Fraser’s
limitations of Tinker, see, for example, Denno v. School Board, 218 F.3d 1267, 1274 n.5
(11th Cir. 2000).
249. See, e.g., Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001)
(broad public school speech code case).
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some version of the Confederate flag.250 Such cases are, however, often
decided without much explicit comparison of any conflicting values, but
more narrowly on the likelihood of a violent confrontation among
students involving a Confederate flag.251 The problem, though, is that
the realistic likelihood in context of a racial incident may reflect
considerations apart from conflicting free speech and equality values. In
one recent case, for example, the court considered a student population
of 1004, of whom a total of fourteen were African-American.252
Remarkably, 75-80% of the students had worn Confederate flags prior to
the ban on such attire.253 Under these circumstances, including the sheer
proportions and raw numbers, the most defensible allocation of rights
may well fail to track the predictably low probability of overt racial
incidents attributable to the nearly ubiquitous Confederate Flag clothing
in particular.254 Would we expect many overt instances of violent racial
conflict in a school population dominated by actual wearers of
Confederate flags?
If we take the most elemental dignitary considerations directly into
account in such cases, we can move past any stalemate between free
speech and equal protection, as well as any automatic trumping of either
claim by the other. Focusing on dignity as an intermediary value
admittedly does not simplify the free speech versus equal protection
analysis. To begin with, considerations of dignity, at least in some sense
of the term, can sometimes be raised on behalf of the Confederate flag
wearer.255 Thus in a recent case, the trial court observed that:
Plaintiff has a strong sense of his southern heritage. He wore the [Confederate]
flag shirts and belt buckle in observance of his roots. Plaintiff’s father hails
from Texas and other family members claim southern heritage as well. Plaintiff
also had relatives who fought on the side of the Confederacy during the Civil
War. One of the Plaintiff’s existing relatives participates in Civil War reenactments.256

250. See, e.g., Scott v. Sch. Bd. 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003); Castorina v.
Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001); Denno, 218 F.3d at 1274; West
v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000); Bragg v. Swanson,
371 F. Supp. 2d 814 (W.D. W. Va. 2005).
251. The inquiry into prior racial incidents in, for example, Sypniewski v. Warren
Hills Regional Board of Education, 307 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 2002), is typical in this regard.
252. See Bragg, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 816.
253. See id. at 820.
254. See id.
255. We here set aside the possibility that turning oneself into a commercial or even
a noncommercial billboard in a public school setting is itself inconsistent with the fullest
dignity of the person.
256. Bragg, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
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The plaintiff’s wardrobe emphasized depictions of the Confederate
flag.257 He apparently wore some Confederate flag image to school
nearly every day for three years.258 Such a plaintiff can certainly be said
to identify with the South, at least in some vague sense. Nor are there
unlimited means of publicly conveying to others that particular social
identification.
Publicly meaningful symbols of one’s basic social
identifications cannot just be selected arbitrarily and then become
immediately effective.259
On the other hand, we might ask whether a merely vague pride in or
identification with the South could not be conveyed as clearly and as
meaningfully by slogans, graphics, maps, or logos not involving the
Confederate flag. The Confederacy, after all, occupies only four of the
South’s hundreds of years of distinctive history and culture. Is the focus
on the Confederacy intended instead to suggest a special devotion to the
South as it was one hundred and fifty years ago, as distinct from the
most recent fifty or one hundred years? Why such a specialized
attraction? Is the Civil War as opposed to Southern history generally a
point of special pride and identification? Why? What would be the
public justification?
In the reported cases, the avowed intentions underlying a Confederate
flag’s focus seem to vary significantly. Some of the expressed attitudes
may strike some as harmlessly disproportionate.260 Some students may
even admit their ignorance of any message likely to be conveyed by the
Confederate flag.261 Other students who emphasize Confederate flag
regalia essentially drop any pretense that their message of identification
is entirely non-racist in nature.262
257. See id. at 819.
258. See id.
259. Hence the controversy over the French ban in public schools of “conspicuous”
as opposed to “discreet” religious symbols such as Muslim head scarves, large Christian
crosses, and Jewish skullcaps. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, Chirac Backs Law to Keep
Signs of Faith Out of School, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at A17.
260. See Bragg, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
261. One disciplined middle school student provided the following account:
I was sitting in math class and I had a piece of paper that I was going to make a
plane on and Dusty Houston told me to write a rebel flag on it and I said no
and he asked me if I even knew what it was and I said yes but I didn’t know
what it meant. So I drew it and he turned me in.
West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358, 1363 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000).
262. See Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 247 (3d Cir.
2002) (“Some [students] formed a ‘gang-like’ group known as ‘the Hicks’ and observed
‘White Power Wednesdays’ by wearing Confederate flag clothing.”).
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Yet other Confederate flag-wearing public school students assert their
lack of any invidious racial intention.263 For some, the Confederate
flag is a “proclamation of heritage”264 or “a non-racist memorial to
their Southern heritage.”265 It is also said, however, that “the vast
majority . . . understand that one[’s] . . . proclamation of heritage is
another’s reminder of the unspeakable cruelties of human bondage.”266
For some persons, despite any professed innocence or neutrality of
intent,267 the Confederate flag unavoidably evokes a historic cultural
nightmare.268 For such persons, the display of the Confederate flag
becomes a “term or condition” of public school attendance on a basis
unequal with those of Caucasian students.
A public school may thus be forced to choose between protecting the
free speech rights of some students to wear clothes displaying the
Confederate flag, and protecting the statutory or constitutional equal
protection rights of other students who wish an educational opportunity
as free of significant distractions as that available to other students. So
conceived, the tradeoff is centrally between the free speech rights of
some and the equal protection rights of others.
It is a tempting mistake to focus on the role of dignity, civility, or
respect in the public schools, and then to set off such dignitary values
themselves directly against freedom of speech. To one degree or
another, the case law provides for the pursuit of civility, shared values,
non-offense, and mutual respect, at some cost to otherwise protected
speech in public schools.269 But to set freedom of speech directly
263. See, e.g., Denno v. Sch. Bd., 218 F.3d 1267, 1274 n.6 (11th Cir. 2000).
264. Bragg, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 816 (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 305 F.3d 241, 242 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc)).
265. Denno, 218 F.3d at 1274 n.6.
266. Bragg, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 816 (quoting Sons of Confederate Veterans, 305
F.3d at 242).
267. See Denno, 218 F.3d at 1274 n.6.
268. See id.; Scott v. Sch. Bd., 324 F.3d 1246, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 2003).
269. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); see also
Denno, 218 F.3d at 1271. A key uncertainty as to the scope of Fraser is whether the
school’s civility-inculcation function is limited to curricular and distinctly schoolsponsored functions, or whether the school’s civility-inculcation function may justify
restriction of student speech in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681
(focusing on a school assembly program); Newsom v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd., 354
F.3d 249, 256 (4th Cir. 2003) (interpreting Fraser limitations on “plainly offensive”
speech as addressing the form or manner but not the “content” of the regulated speech);
Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1537-38 (7th Cir. 1996) (student
speech in a nonpublic forum as governed by the lax Hazelwood rational basis test even if
the speech was not clearly school sponsored); Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978
F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (detecting three categories: “vulgar, lewd, obscene, and
plainly offensive speech, . . . school-sponsored speech, and . . . speech that falls into
neither of these categories”) (first category may be restricted even outside context of the
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against the net balance of the arguably mixed or conflicting270 dignitary
effects noted above271 in the Confederate flag context is to compare a
recognized constitutional right with merely a balance of dignitary
considerations, none of which by itself rises to the level of a
constitutional right.
We might rightly assume that the indignity of recurrent reminders,
intended or not, of historic barbarities outweighs the indignity of merely
selecting another way of conveying authentic regional pride through
school clothing. Nonetheless, we cannot balance a constitutional right to
speech with dignity considerations, however morally basic, and however
linkable to constitutional rights, that do not themselves amount to a
constitutional right.272
Instead, the proper role of dignitary considerations is to mediate
between the free speech and equal protection implications of the
Confederate flag cases. While both free speech and equal protection
claims raise direct issues of constitutional right, and dignity in even the
most crucial sense does not, dignitary considerations can be used to
translate and more persuasively adjudicate the conflicts between free
speech and equal protection.
We may rightly conclude that in the typical public school Confederate
flag case the balance of the deepest, most serious, and least merely
second category); Griggs v. Fort Wayne Sch. Bd., 359 F. Supp. 2d 731, 740-41 (N.D.
Ind. 2005) (discussing Muller); Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 2d
1096, 1103 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (similarly applying Chandler to scope of Fraser); Pinard v.
Clatskanie Sch. Dist., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1217 (D. Or. 2004) (same).
270. This is not to suggest that the dignitary effects in Confederate flag cases are
equal or that they operate at the same level and partake of the same sense of dignity. It
should not be difficult to determine that the dignitary value of being spared graphic
reminders of brutal historical depredations will typically outweigh the loss of dignitary
value between wearing a Confederate flag to school and wearing some other
representation of regional pride.
271. See supra notes 253-57, 261-64, and accompanying text. The balancing of
dignitary interests should not provide incentives for exaggerated claims, hysterical
overreactions, hypersensitivity, or largely “strategic” outrage, in an attempt to outweigh
the other side. But some forms of dignity and indignity are, by a consensus elsewhere
fairly established, more basic than others and obviously grounded in the events of
American cultural history.
272. Attempts to protect dignity generally or to promote mutual respect generally in
public schools are likely to be seen to trench upon free speech rights. See, e.g., Saxe v.
State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 n.12 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussed in
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 261). But cf. Borof v.
Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding regulation of
non-racially offensive lyrics where the school policy had emphasized, inter alia, “human
dignity and worth” rather than focusing especially on equality).
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adolescent dignitary claims, given the alternative available means of
speaking, lies typically in favor of the equal protection claims at some
limited expense to freedom of student speech. Dignitary considerations
in this kind of case will thus ordinarily tip in favor of the equality
claims.
But can such an approach and general conclusion be accused of
hypocrisy? What if some African-American students wore “X” clothes
to public school,273 with whatever intent, and some Caucasian students
interpreted the symbolic speech as supporting not only Malcolm X and
the Black Muslim movement, but hostility toward Caucasians in
general? How, consistent with the above analysis of the Confederate
flag cases, should such a case be approached?
Such a case would set the specific free speech rights of the AfricanAmerican students against whatever equal protection claims the Caucasian
students could cogently make. Various dignitary considerations would
arise on both sides. Among most obvious points, the nature and weight
of interests of African-Americans and Caucasians are not always
symmetrical as a matter of history and culture. Patterns of legal
dominance, subordination, and control are not casually reversible or
subject to dismissal on the basis of some formal symmetry. The stigma
and cultural baggage associated with arguable hate speech is not always
the same in either direction. Historical dominance and subordination do
not leave essentially similar impacts on the involved groups. This is
largely a matter of taking the inequalities, and the subordination,
seriously.
We would have no reason to imagine that the psychological and
related dignitary effects of wearing “X” clothing in a public high school
in Eastern Kentucky274 would parallel those of wearing a Confederate
flag under otherwise similar circumstances. We could not expect
epithets targeted at Caucasians to have the depth of dignitary effects
comparable to Klan-oriented epithet speech,275 given our cultural history.
The asymmetric power relationships involved, the events of history, and
the continuing disparities in power and influence, make it more likely
that no epithet can target Caucasians with comparable effect.
For the sake of encouraging reasonable regulation and other dimensions
of practical political realism, we could well make the strategic
calculation that all legal restrictions on group-offensive clothing should
be formally neutral. No group would be allowed to speak through
273. See Castorina v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 541 (6th Cir. 2001).
274. See id.
275. See, e.g., Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Gary, 334
F.3d 676, 684 (7th Cir. 2003).
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images understandably offensive to any other cognizable group. Such
rules may be in practice more broadly politically acceptable, whatever
their cultural and historical or psychological realism, or their potential
for abuse.
VI. CONCLUSION
The above explorations of some forms of hate speech, and of
Confederate flag display in the public schools, are only illustrations.
They show, however, that basic understandings of dignity, along generally
Kantian lines, can be used to do extremely important adjudicative work.
Without itself rising to the level of a constitutional right, the idea of
dignity can, with logic and legitimacy, be employed to choose between
unavoidably conflicting values of free speech and equal protection.
The idea of dignity will not always point unequivocally to a single
constitutional outcome. But conflicts between free speech and equal
protection, as well as between free speech and other constitutional
values, are so frequent, so important, and so otherwise intractable that
we should further explore any promising means of resolving them.

575

WRIGHT.DOC

576

11/9/2006 4:01 PM

